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MARKET STRUCTURE  and macroeconomic  fluctuations  are related  to each 
other in two different  ways. First, macroeconomic  fluctuations  reveal a 
good deal about market  structure.  Students of industrial  organization 
have not generally  exploited  cyclical movements  in their  research;  they 
have concentrated  almost entirely on cross-sectional analysis. One of 
my goals in this paper is to look at some standard  issues in industrial 
organization  through  time series variation  in individual  industries  as it is 
associated  with the aggregate  business cycle. Second, market  structure 
has an important  role in the propagation  of macroeconomic  shocks. In 
competitive  industries,  there are strong  forces pushing  toward  equilib- 
rium.  Hence, competitive  market  structure  seems to require  an equilib- 
rium  interpretation  of fluctuations.  Where sellers have market  power, 
on the other hand, there is no presumption  of full, efficient resource 
utilization.  Fluctuations  may be the perverse consequence of noncom- 
petitive  conditions. 
The first part of the paper looks at the experience of some fifty 
industries  at the two-digit  standard  industrial  classification  (SIC) code 
level, covering all sectors of the U.S. economy. It reaches two basic 
conclusions  about  the market  structure  of American  industry.  The first 
is that  the majority  of the industries  are noncompetitive  in an important 
way. Specifically,  they choose to operate  at a point  where marginal  cost 
is well below price, a policy that makes sense only if firms influence 
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prices through  their  volumes of production,  that is, if they are noncom- 
petitive. I measure  marginal  cost in a straightforward  way. Each boom 
or recession in the national  economy causes increases or decreases in 
output  and  cost in an industry.  Of course, changes  in the prices  of inputs 
also cause changes in cost, but such changes can be measured and 
eliminated. The ratio of the change in cost, adjusted for input price 
changes,  to the  change  in  output  is marginal  cost. Comparison  of marginal 
cost to price, observed directly, completes the analysis. I estimate the 
markup  ratio, the ratio of price to marginal  cost. In competition, the 
markup  ratio is 1, whereas with market  power it exceeds 1. In most 
industries  in my sample, the hypothesis of unit markup  is rejected in 
favor of higher  values. In many  industries  the markup  ratio  is above 1.5 
and  in a few it exceeds 3. 
My second conclusion about market  structure  turns  on the question 
of whether  market  power necessarily  translates  into excess profit.  At a 
minimum,  this investigation  is needed in order to make my findings  of 
significant  market power credible in view of the fact that the total 
profitability  of U.S. business is not far above the level that represents  a 
reasonable return  to capital. Some explanation is needed for market 
power's failure to bring much profit. My work asks whether firms 
minimize  cost with  respect  to a constant-returns  technology,  or  whether, 
on the contrary,  they incur  fixed costs or other types of costs in excess 
of  that benchmark. The conclusion favors the second case: many 
industries  have costs above the level implied  by minimizing  cost with 
respect to a constant-returns  technology. The typical firm in these 
industries  is operating  on a decreasing  portion  of its average  cost curve. 
Again,  fluctuations  in the overall  economy are  used to measure  marginal 
cost. A firm that minimizes cost with constant returns will earn the 
market  return  on its capital  when the return  is calculated  as profit,  using 
marginal  cost in place of price to value output. In most industries  in the 
sample,  the return  to capital  calculated  in this way is negative,  indicating 
that they cannot be minimizing  cost with respect to a constant-returns 
technology. They hold chronic excess capacity because of a minimum 
practical  scale of operation  or they have true  fixed costs. 
These findings support a view of  the typical industry originally 
proposed by Edward  Chamberlin.'  Through  product  differentiation  or 
1.  Edward Hastings Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic  Competition (Harvard 
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geographical  separation,  firms  have power in their own markets.  How- 
ever, there are no barriers  to market  entry, so firms enter each niche 
until profit  is driven to zero. Because of a minimum  practical  scale of 
operation,  the typical production  unit has excess capacity in the zero- 
profit  equilibrium. 
The second part of the paper examines the implications of these 
findings  for macroeconomics.  The most straightforward  implication  is a 
simple  explanation  for the well-documented  phenomenon  of procyclical 
productivity.  In the type of equilibrium  consistent with my empirical 
findings, marginal  cost falls considerably short of price. Hence, the 
calculation  of total factor productivity  through  the method developed 
by Robert  Solow, which  assumes  the equality  of price  and  marginal  cost, 
involves a bias. I show that  this bias has the right  sign and magnitude  to 
explain  the observed  procyclical  behavior  of productivity. 
The  findings  about  industry  structure  also have  important  implications 
for macroeconomic fluctuations. It is  now well  understood that a 
noncompetitive  economy does not have the automatic  full-employment 
tendency of the competitive  economy. Recent authors  have built theo- 
retical  models in which market  power implies  that  the equilibrium  of the 
economy occurs at a point with unused labor. Some of these models 
have multiple  equilibria.  However, there is still a large  gap between the 
theoretical  models and  empirical  work. 
The ultimate  goal of research in this area is to build and estimate a 
model in which the economy moves from one equilibrium  to another, 
each involving  different  levels of resource utilization.  A recession and 
succeeding recovery would be explained as an episode during  which 
output  and employment  as determined  by the equilibrium  of the model 
first  shrank  and  later  expanded.  However, work  has not yet reached  this 
point. Therefore, I will limit my own consideration  to the question of 
how market  power and excess capacity diminish the strength of the 
economy's drive  to full employment. 
Consider a competitive firm with a well-defined level of capacity 
(capacity is the level of output where the marginal  cost curve turns 
upward  and becomes nearly vertical). Such a firm is unlikely to be 
satisfied  with producing  less than its capacity output. As the empirical 
work in the first part of the paper shows, marginal  cost is low when 
output  is below capacity. Unless price falls all the way to the low level 
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is substantial  incremental  profit  to be made by putting  more output on 
the market.  The competitor  never fears that added  output  will spoil the 
market,  for the absence of that concern  is the definition  of competition. 
Hence, output  rises to capacity.  The only other  possibility  is for price  to 
fall to a low level. 
In the world  described  by my empirical  findings,  the incentive  to keep 
output at capacity is nowhere near as strong. A business faced with 
disappointing  sales in a recession hesitates to push more output  on the 
market,  because the market  will absorb  it only at a lower price. Profit 
will hardly  rise. Indeed, profit  may not rise at all-the  decline in price 
may exactly offset the increase  in sales volume. 
For a business in a Chamberlinian  equilibrium,  the trade-off  between 
sales volume and  product  price is a matter  of low priority  because it has 
only small implications  for profit. Product design, cost control, and 
marketing  are  the important  business  decisions. It is true,  of course, that 
recessions  bring  large  reductions  in  profit  for  most  businesses. However, 
they cannot recover profit by cutting price and raising volume. A 
minimum  conclusion  from my research, then, is that the incentives are 
weak for those business actions that  would restore  full employment. 
Macroeconomic  Fluctuations and Market Structure 
Macroeconomic  fluctuations  continuously  bring  about  natural  exper- 
iments  that  reveal marginal  cost. When  a boom causes a firm  to raise its 
output,  the firm  incurs  extra  cost to produce  that  output.  The ratio  of the 
cost increase  to the output  increase  is marginal  cost. The empirical  work 
described  in this section is no more  than  a refinement  of this simple  idea. 
A much more complete exposition of the technique is available in an 
earlier  paper  of mine.2 
Some economists make  a distinction  between short-run  and  long-run 
marginal  cost. For my purposes, that distinction is somewhat off the 
point. I define marginal  cost as the derivative  of the cost function  with 
respect to output, holding  the capital  stock constant. In the out years of 
2. Robert  Hall, "The Relation  between Price and Marginal  Cost in U.S. Industry," 
Working  Paper  E-86-24  (Hoover  Institution,  Stanford  University,  June 1986).  An earlier 
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a firm's  plan, my measure  of marginal  cost will equal  long-run  marginal 
cost,  because the firm will plan a cost-minimizing  capital stock. In 
competition,  the firm  will equate  its marginal  cost to the market  price of 
its product, where marginal  cost is defined as I have indicated. The 
equality will hold whether or not the firm is capable of adjusting  its 
capital stock to the current  market  price. If the firm  cannot adjust its 
capital  stock in the short  run,  then  my definition  corresponds  to the usual 
concept of short-run  marginal  cost. 
COMPARING  MARGINAL  COST  AND  PRICE 
The simplest  version  of my method  applies  when output  and employ- 
ment change from one year to the next, but the capital stock remains 
constant. I will also assume that the firm  does not use any materials  as 
inputs;  labor  is the only variable  input.  Then  I measure  marginal  cost, x, 
as 
AN 
x=  wa  , 
WAQ  -OQ' 
where w is the hourly wage, N is hours of work, Q is the quantity  of 
output, and 0 is the rate of technical  progress. Note that the change in 
output, AQ, must be adjusted  for the amount  by which output would 
have risen, OQ,  had  there  been no increase  in labor  input. 
All the variables  in the marginal  cost formula  are observed directly 
except  for marginal  cost and  the rate  of technical  progress.  Robert  Solow 
exploited  that fact in his famous paper  on productivity  measurement  in 
which he assumed  that marginal  cost was equal to price and solved the 
equation  for the rate of technical  progress.3  Not surprisingly,  all of the 
calculations  in Solow's paper are closely related to productivity  mea- 
surement,  and the results are intimately  related  to the cyclical behavior 
of productivity. 
I will proceed in a somewhat different  way from Solow. Instead of 
making  the assumption that marginal  cost equals price, I will make 
assumptions  about  technical  progress  and derive conclusions  about the 
relation  between marginal  cost and price. The assumption  is that tech- 
3. Robert  M. Solow, "Technical  Change  and the Aggregate  Production  Function," 
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nical progress  can be viewed as random  deviations  from an underlying 
constant  rate: 
Ot  =  0  +  ut. 
The randomness  of the deviation  is expressed  in a particular  way, which 
is absolutely central to all of the empirical  work in this paper: ut is 
uncorrelated  with the business cycle. That  assumption  is based on two 
hypotheses of this work. First, the ups and  downs of the economy, from 
whatever  source, do not cause year-to-year  changes  in productivity.  On- 
the-job  learning  by doing or research  and development  stimulated  by a 
vibrant  economy does not yield immediate  improvements  in productiv- 
ity. The effects are spread  over sufficiently  many years that the corre- 
lation  of ut  with the business cycle is negligible.  Second, fluctuations  in 
productivity  growth do not themselves cause the business cycle. That 
is,, I assume that recessions are not the result of a sudden reduced 
effectiveness of technology, nor are booms episodes in which output 
rises more than  usual because production  functions  have shifted  favor- 
ably. In this respect, my assumption  conflicts squarely  with the "real 
business cycle" school, which views variations  in the rate of technical 
progress  as one of the main  driving  forces of the business cycle. 
Another  assumption  I make  is that  a firm's  markup  ratio-the  ratio  of 
price to marginal  cost-can  reasonably  be approximated  as a constant 
over time. The assumption  does not commit me to a "markup"  theory 
of pricing.  Rather,  it says only that  the outcome of the decision process 
by which a firm  chooses its marginal  cost and, possibly, its price  is such 
that the ratio  of the two is approximately  a constant. The assumption  is 
completely compatible  with competition,  where the markup  ratio must 
be 1. I denote the markup  ratio  as Vt. 
Inserting  the assumptions  about  productivity  growth  and  the markup 
ratio  into the formula  for marginal  cost gives 
p_  w AN 
AQ -  (0 +  u)Q 
Solving  for the change  in output  yields 
w 
AQ =i  p~AN  +  (  + u) Q. 
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In rates of change, this is 
AQ  wNAN 
_=F  +O+u. 
Q  pQ  N 
Letting  Aq and An be the rates of change, and letting cx  be the revenue 
share  of labor, wNlpQ, I get, finally, 
Aq =  F^xA n +  0 +  u. 
To see what this formula  means, consider  first  the case of competition, 
where p.  is 1. In this case, the formula  says that the rate of change of 
output  is equal to the rate of change of labor  input  weighted  by labor's 
share  in revenue, c, plus the constant  and random  elements of produc- 
tivity growth. Note that, under competition, the revenue share is a 
measure  of the elasticity  of the production  function  with  respect  to labor 
input. 
Solow's method  for measuring  productivity  growth  is simply  to move 
0 to the left-hand  side of the equation and output growth to the right- 
hand  side. The "Solow residual"  is just Aq -  cx  A n, the part  of output 
growth  not explained  by growth  in labor  input. 
As stated, my assumption  is that u is uncorrelated  with the business 
cycle. As is well known  and  amply  confirmed  by the results  of this paper, 
the Solow residual is quite procyclical. Recall that Solow's approach 
assumes competition,  that is, p. =  1. The finding  of a procyclical  Solow 
residual  leads to one of two conclusions: either my assumption  of zero 
correlation  is incorrect,  or the firm  is not competitive.  My work  follows 
the path  of the second conclusion. A value of p.  in excess of 1  will lower 
the correlation  of the residual,  u, and the business cycle. My approach, 
stripped  to its absolute  basics, is to choose as the estimate  of p.  the value 
that is just high enough to leave the residual uncorrelated  with the 
business cycle. Plainly, the truth lies somewhere between the polar 
cases. Not every industry is perfectly competitive even in the most 
optimistic  view, and some degree of correlation  between productivity 
shifts and the business cycle would be conceded by any reasonable 
observer. However, my work proceeds on the assumption that the 
correlation  is small  enough  to be ignored. 
But, a chorus of readers will object, there are numerous sound 
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sound  economic reasons, however, turn  out to involve noncompetitive 
behavior.  Consider  the explanation  based on labor  hoarding.  Productiv- 
ity declines in a temporary  slump  because idle workers  are kept at the 
firm in anticipation  that their future employment will be profitable. 
However, in a competitive industry  one of two things will happen  in a 
slump. If workers are idle, marginal  cost is at a low level because 
additional  hours  of labor  are available  for free. The industry  price must 
fall  to this  low level of marginal  cost, or  it must  fall  far  enough  to stimulate 
demand to the point of eliminating  all hoarded  workers. In the latter 
case, neither output nor employment falls in the slump, so nothing 
happens  to productivity.  In the former  case, the decline in the price has 
to be considered  in the productivity  calculation.  The  price  decline  makes 
the revenue share  of labor,  cx  = wNlpQ, rise dramatically.  The residual 
gives a much  higher  than  normal  weight  to whatever  employment  decline 
occurs, enough  so that  measured  productivity  is unchanged.4 
Other  explanations  of procyclical  productivity  either  are  also founded 
on assumptions  of noncompetitive  firms  or fail to explain  why Solow's 
method  for measuring  productivity  has a procyclical  bias. For example, 
it is true that productivity  will be found to be procyclical  in an industry 
where all firms operate chronically on the declining portion of their 
average  cost curves. However, such industries  cannot be competitive, 
because when price and marginal  cost are equal and marginal  cost is 
below average  cost, firms  would  have losses at all times. Or,  if firms  have 
overhead labor but are competitive, then Solow's calculation  will not 
give procyclical  productivity.  The  reason  is that  Solow uses the observed 
real wage to adjust  for the impact  of those changes in employment  that 
actually  occur over the cycle. Under competition,  where the real wage 
correctly measures the marginal  product, his adjustment  will operate 
exactly to offset the changes  in output  in the productivity  calculation.  It 
is true  that  overhead  labor  makes  output  per  employee-hour  procyclical, 
but it does not make  Solow's productivity  measure  procyclical. 
My argument  that competition rules out procyclical productivity 
applies only to Solow's type of calculation, not to measures such as 
output  per employee-hour.  Other  measures  could easily be procyclical. 
But my work rests on Solow's measure,  in which the response of price 
rules out procyclical  productivity  under  competition. 
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Of course, in the real world, firms hoarding  labor do not cut their 
prices to the level of marginal  cost with free labor. Price remains  high 
even when marginal  cost falls. But this only confirms my point that 
procyclical  productivity  involves noncompetitive  behavior. 
Changes in the Capital Stock.  My derivation so far has assumed that 
the capital  stock does not change  from  one observation  to the next. The 
computations  are easily modified  to handle  the case where capital  does 
change.  In  fact, all  that  is involved  is redefinition  of Aq  as the  proportional 
change  in the output-capital  ratio and of An as the proportional  change 
in the labor-capital  ratio. 
Errors  in measuring  capital  are  a potential  source  of bias  in my method 
for estimating  the markup  ratio. A bias in the estimate  of p.  will occur if 
the measurement  error  is correlated  with the business cycle. The most 
likely source of bias is that the capital stock will be measured  as the 
amount,  of capital  available  to the firm,  whereas the calculations  should 
use the amount  of capital  actually  in use. Such an error  would certainly 
be correlated  with the business cycle, since capital  utilization  falls in a 
slump. However, the bias from this source depends on the pure user 
cost of capital. If the firm  perceives the cost of higher  capital  utilization 
to be zero, because there is no pure  user cost of capital,  then the bias is 
zero. If the pure user cost is positive, the bias in the estimate of the 
markup  ratio, pt,  is positive. 
Materials. Generalization  of Solow's method  for productivity  mea- 
surement  to include inputs of materials  is straightforward.  Each input 
appears on the right-hand  side of the equation as the product of its 
revenue share and its rate of growth. Practitioners of  total factor 
productivity  have made calculations with dozens of different factors 
treated  in this way. However, the data available  for my work do not 
include explicit measures of materials. Instead, materials  have been 
subtracted  from  output  in order  to arrive  at value added. I have carried 
out a full analysis  of the implications  of applying  my version  of Solow's 
method  to data  on value added.5  In general,  the estimate  of the markup 
coefficient, pt,  obtained  from the relation  between labor input  and real 
value  added  is an overstatement  of the markup  of the full  price  of output 
over marginal  cost. The magnitude  of the overstatement  depends  on the 
correlation  of materials  and  output.  In  the  unlikely  case where  the growth 
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of materials  input  is uncorrelated  with the growth  of output,  there  would 
be no overstatement  of Vt.  At the opposite pole, which is more  realistic, 
when materials  grow in strict  proportion  to output,  the overstatement  is 
governed  by a simple  formula.  The estimated  markup  coefficient, Vt,  is 
then interpreted  as the ratio  of the price deflator  to marginal  labor  cost. 
Because the price deflator is the price less unit materials cost, and 
marginal  labor cost is marginal  cost less the same unit materials  cost, 
the value added markup, Vt,  necessarily overstates the gross output 
markup,  say t*. The formula  governing  their  relation  is 
*  _  _  _ 
1  +  (V  -  l)m' 
where m is the ratio of materials  cost to total revenue. The ratio m is 
available only in those years when the Commerce Department has 
compiled  input-output  tables, not on an annual  basis. 
The gross output  markup  coefficient, *,  measures  the markup  of the 
actual  price of a product  over its marginal  cost of production,  under  the 
assumption  that the firm  is a price-taker  in its materials  markets.  But * 
understates  the departure  of any given price  from its competitive  level, 
because the materials suppliers are unlikely to be competitive. In 
principle,  in order  to find the degree of departure  of a given price from 
its competitive  level, one would have to carry  out a full analysis of the 
upstream  suppliers,  using input-output  data. I have not yet tried to do 
that. However, there is one simple case where the answer is obvious. 
Suppose  the upstream  suppliers  are similar  to the industry  under  exam- 
ination-specifically, they have the same markups  and the same mate- 
rials shares. Then the value added markup  for the industry  is also the 
markup  of price  over full  marginal  cost, counting  the upstream  markups. 
The exercise  just considered  is made  even more  relevant  by the fact that 
many of  the firms studied here are vertically integrated into their 
upstream supply industries. Working with input-output  data would 
involve the arbitrary  transfer  prices used by such firms  for their  reports 
to the Commerce  Department.  In a firm  that used its upstream  unit's 
actual  marginal  cost as the transfer  price, all of its market  power would 
be assigned  to its downstream  unit  with my method.  On the other  hand, 
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the downstream unit would understate the monopoly power of the 
integrated  operation. 
Econometric  Method. The equation  to be estimated  is 
Aq =  ,u x  lAn +  0 +  u. 
The slope, pL,  is the markup  ratio  and  the constant, 0, is the average  rate 
of technical  progress. The general  principle  of estimation  is to find the 
value of p.  such that the residual, u, is uncorrelated  with the business 
cycle. More specifically, I use an instrumental  variable  estimator  with 
the rate  of growth  of real  gross national  product,  Ay, as the instrument. 
As indicated  earlier, the assumption  that u is uncorrelated  with the 
change in real GNP derives from two basic hypotheses of this work. 
First, fluctuations  in productivity  growth  in any given industry  are not 
causes of fluctuations  in total real GNP. That is, genuine productivity 
growth  is not a driving  force in the business cycle. Shifts in production 
functions do not occur quickly enough and do not have sufficiently 
widespread  effects to make an important  contribution  to year-to-year 
changes in real GNP. Second, the aggregate  business cycle does not 
itself cause fluctuations  in productivity.  The production  function of a 
given industry  does not shift when national  output rises or falls. The 
actual  fluctuations  in productivity  observed  over the cycle are either  the 
result  of using  a method  of productivity  measurement  other  than  Solow's 
total  factor  productivity  or the consequence of market  power. 
Many  other  instrumental  variables  could be considered  in addition  to 
the  change  in real  GNP. I have experimented  with  real  military  spending, 
but it is inadequate  by itself and has little incremental  power when the 
change  in real  GNP is already  used. In future  research,  I plan  to explore 
the use of industry-specific  instruments  such as federal  purchases  of the 
output  of the industry.  Better instruments  could improve  the results in 
two ways. First, under  the hypotheses that  justify the use of real GNP 
as an instrument,  additional  instruments  could  reduce  the standard  error 
of the estimate  of the markup  ratio. In industries  whose output  is hardly 
correlated  with GNP, the improvement  could be substantial.  Second, 
alternative  instruments  might  enable me to test the assumption  that the 
productivity disturbance in each industry is  uncorrelated with the 
national  business cycle. 
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sectors of the U.S. economy and for durables  and nondurables  within 
manufacturing.6  From  the national  income  and  product  accounts, I have 
taken real and nominal  value added, indirect  business taxes, hours of 
work of  all employees, total compensation for each industry, and 
aggregate real GNP. In addition, I have used Bureau of Economic 
Analysis data on the net real capital  stock for each industry.  From the 
data,  I have computed  the price  net of indirect  business  taxes as the ratio 
of nominal  value added  less indirect  business taxes to real value added. 
Because compensation  includes  social security  contributions  and other 
fringe  benefits, and the concept of price excludes sales taxes and other 
indirect  taxes, the price and labor  cost data are on a comparable  basis. 
That  is, a competitive  industry  would  equate  marginal  cost based on this 
concept of labor  cost to this concept of the price of output. 
Because the national  income and product  accounts discontinued  the 
compilation  of the comprehensive  measure  of labor  input  after 1978,  the 
sample  period  is 1949  through  1978.  The data  are annual. 
I have used data for all of the two-digit industries  included in the 
national  income and product  accounts except for the following, where 
problems in measuring  output are so severe as to make the results 
questionable  no matter  how they come out:  petroleum  refining,  banking, 
insurance  carriers,  real estate, holding  companies, health  services, and 
educational  services. For petroleum  refining,  the calculation  of value 
added  seems to be severely distorted  by the treatment  of foreign  income 
taxes. For banking,  insurance,  and  holding  companies,  there are severe 
problems in adding back to purchases of services the value of the 
financial  return  paid to customers for their financial  investments. For 
health and educational services, many transactions are outside the 
market.  There remain  forty-eight  two-digit  industries  after these dele- 
tions. 
Results. Table 1 shows the results of estimation  for the forty-eight 
industries,  which are divided into two groups:  those in which cyclical 
fluctuations  have enough impact on employment and output to shed 
6. Most of the industries  are at the two-digit  SIC level; some are groups  of two-digit 
industries  and some are three-digit  or groups of three-digit  industries. The grouped 
industries  are coal mining  (code 11 in table, SIC codes 11 and 12);  other transportation 
equipment  (372 in table; SIC codes 372-379);  farms (1 in table; SIC codes 1 and 2); 
agricultural  services  (7 in table;  SIC  codes 7, 8, and  9);  construction  (15  in table;  SIC  codes 
15, 16, and 17);  wholesale  trade  (50 in table;  SIC codes 50 and 51);  and  retail  trade  (52 in 
table;  SIC  codes 52-57). Robert E. Hall  297 
some light on the value of the markup  ratio and those in which cyclical 
fluctuations  are  weak  or  absent  and  are  thus  uninformative.  The  criterion 
for choosing the informative  cases is that the standard  error of the 
estimate  of pi  be 1.0  or smaller.  The  criterion  is loose and  merely  excludes 
the cases of completely  useless results. 
Only  three  of the forty-eight  industries  had inadmissible  estimates  of 
pi, below 1: other transportation  equipment, security and commodity 
brokers, and agricultural  services. All of them are within 1 standard 
error  of the competitive  value of 1. In thirteen  industries,  the hypothesis 
of competition is decisively rejected in favor of market power; the 
estimate  of pt  -  1  is more  than  double  its standard  error.  In most of these 
instances, the estimated  value of p.  indicates economically substantial 
market power. In six industries-paper,  chemicals, primary metals, 
motor  vehicles, railroad  transportation,  and  trucking  and  warehousing- 
the value of p.  exceeded 2 and departed  from competition  by at least 2 
standard  errors  as well. Two of these industries-railroads and truck- 
ing-were  regulated  throughout  the sample  period. In a decade or so, it 
should be possible to determine  whether deregulation  has made them 
more  competitive. 
A few industries-textiles,  lumber, and other transportation  equip- 
ment-are  shown to be reasonably close to competitive, in that the 
estimate of the markup  ratio is at least 1 standard  error  below 1.4. In 
these industries,  the data say that  the chances are at least five out of six 
that  the markup  is 40 percent  or less. 
Table 1  also shows results  for two aggregates  within  manufacturing- 
nondurables  and durables.  The markup  ratios are estimated  to be 1.61 
and 1.62, respectively, with very small  standard  errors.  The hypothesis 
of competition  is decisively rejected  for the aggregates  as well. 
In summary,  most two-digit  industries  show signs of market  power, 
and in a significant  part of the economy, market  power is substantial. 
The  evidence  is based  on the finding  that  increases  in output  are  achieved 
with  increases  in labor  input  that  cost relatively  little in comparison  with 
the price  charged  for the output. 
EXCESS  CAPACITY 
With  all this market  power, shouldn't  American  industry  be inordi- 
nately profitable?  But if it were, then a new puzzle would result: why 298  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
Table 1.  Estimates of Markup Ratios, by Industry,  1949-78a 
Standard  Summary statistic 
industrial 
classification  Markup  Standard  Durbin- 
(SIC) code  Industry  ratio  error  Watson 
Meaningful  estimatesb 
Substantial  market power 
28  Chemicals  3.39  0.78  1.99 
26  Paper  2.68  0.33  1.45 
40  Railroad  transportation  2.38  0.35  1.64 
44  Water  transportation  2.16  0.65  1.44 
371  Motor  vehicles  2.07  0.22  2.42 
33  Primary  metals  2.06  0.15  2.36 
42  Trucking  and warehousing  2.06  0.48  2.28 
Some  market power 
32  Stone, clay, and glass  1.81  0.22  2.21 
11  Coal mining  1.68  0.51  0.71 
27  Printing  and publishing  1.61  0.66  1.74 
76  Repair  1.60  0.23  2.39 
31  Leather  1.59  0.33  2.66 
70  Hotels and lodging  1.59  0.88  2.76 
39  Miscellaneous  1.52  0.55  2.70 
36  Electrical  machinery  1.43  0.15  2.35 
48  Communications  1.43  0.64  1.92 
30  Rubber  1.41  0.20  2.41 
35  Nonelectrical  machinery  1.39  0.10  2.23 
34  Fabricated  metals  1.39  0.13  1.42 
25  Furniture  1.38  0.17  2.19 
23  Apparel  1.30  0.24  2.04 
38  Instruments  1.29  0.15  2.38 
95  Total nondurables  1.61  0.19  1.81 
96  Total durables  1.62  0.09  1.87 
Little market power 
15  Construction  1.11  0.34  1.43 
22  Textiles  1.05  0.27  1.88 
24  Lumber  1.00  0.21  1.87 
7  Agricultural  services  0.92  0.74  2.29 
372  Other  transportation  equipment  0.91  0.18  1.65 
62  Security  and commodity  brokers  0.56  0.92  2.02 
Unreliable  estimatesc 
10  Metal  mining  2.80  1.23  2.16 
45  Air transportation  3.28  1.33  1.40 
483  Radio and TV broadcasting  2.00  1.40  2.08 
78  Motion  pictures  2.87  1.63  2.46 
20  Food and beverages  3.09  1.64  1.55 Robert E. Hall  299 
wouldn't  new firms  enter  the market  and compete away the profit?  One 
powerful  body of thought holds that competition is the only possible 
outcome in the long run in an industry without barriers to  entry. 
According  to that view, market  power creates profit  opportunities,  so 
entry  will occur up to the point that market  power is fully dissipated  by 
the multiplicity  of sellers. Even more optimistically,  the "contestable 
markets"  school argues that the mere possibility of entry will enforce 
competition  in a market  with few sellers.7 
The model of the coexistence of market  power and free entry, first 
articulated  by Edward  Chamberlin  and put on a more  formal  footing  by 
Michael  Spence, Avinash Dixit, and Joseph Stiglitz, has two essential 
ingredients.8  First, there must be some separation  between the markets 
Table 1.  (continued) 
Standard  Summary statistic 
industrial 
classification  Markup  Standard  Durbin- 
(SIC) code  Industry  ratio  error  Watson 
21  Tobacco  1.28  2.14  2.26 
52  Retail trade  3.63  2.19  2.04 
50  Wholesale  trade  3.67  2.67  1.35 
81  Legal services  4.09  2.75  1.78 
75  Auto repair  -  1.46  4.74  0.37 
41  Local  and interurban transit  -  1.61  7.00  1.83 
79  Amusement  0.35  7.97  1.78 
61  Credit agencies  -0.81  8.10  0.93 
49  Utilities  10.18  9.09  0.42 
13  Oil and gas extraction  11.30  13.20  0.62 
64  Insurance agents  -4.14  28.10  2.32 
1  Farms  17.20  28.90  1.13 
14  Nonmetallic  minerals  20.30  104.00  1.61 
46  Pipelines  50.50  182.00  1.94 
73  Business  services  -  10.40  432.00  0.85 
Sources:  Author's  estimates  as described  in text.  The data used  in the calculations  are from the national income 
and product accounts. 
a.  The markup ratio, ,u, is estimated from the equation: Aq =  ,u a An +  0  +  u, using the rate of growth of GNP, 
Ay, as an instrumental variable. The dependent variable, Aq, is the change in output; a is the revenue  share of labor, 
An is the change  in hours of labor, and 0 is a constant  measuring the mean rate of technical  progress. 
b.  Standard error of the estimate  of the markup ratio, ,u, is  1.0 or smaller. 
c.  Industries with too little cyclical  variation to measure the markup ratio. 
7. And  the school  is based  far  to the east of Chicago.  See William  J. Baumol,  John  C. 
Panzar, and Robert D. Willig, Contestable  Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure 
(Harcourt,  Brace,  Jovanovich,  1982). 
8.  Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic  Competition; Michael Spence,  "Product 
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of rivals.  The  formal  treatments  usually  consider  product  differentiation, 
but  geographic  dispersion  of markets  will have the same  effect. Second, 
there must be fixed costs of some kind associated with each distinct 
market. Absent market differentiation,  a single seller could supply 
multiple  markets  from  a single  production  unit. As many  sellers came to 
do this, competition  would  be the result.  Absent  fixed  costs, each market 
could be served by a great  many sellers operating  at a small scale, and 
competition  would again  be the result. 
With  differentiated  markets  and  fixed costs, a zero-profit  equilibrium 
with market  power will emerge. The smallest  markets  will be served by 
a single  seller. Although  that  seller  may  make  some profit,  each potential 
entrant  foresees that  it cannot  cover its fixed  costs at the  price  that  would 
result  from  the competition  between  the two were the new seller  to enter 
the market.  Hence the market  is in equilibrium  with monopoly. Larger 
markets  may be able to sustain  more than one seller, but still there will 
be some market  power in equilibrium.  The details of the equilibrium 
with more than one seller depend on what theory of oligopoly governs 
their  interaction.  If the sellers reach  the monopoly  price  by collusion or 
otherwise, then market  power will remain  strong. If the equilibrium  is 
the type described  by Cournot,  the price will approach  the competitive 
level as the number  of sellers grows. In the version of the story with 
product differentiation,  it generally pays for the entrant to adopt a 
differentiated  product,  so there is always  just one seller  in each market. 
The  empirical  work  in  this  paper  does not  attempt  to test Chamberlin's 
model specifically, but instead examines the profit earned by various 
industries  and compares it with the profit  that would be earned by an 
industry  with the degree of monopoly  power found in the results of the 
previous  section. The calculation  of latent  monopoly  profit  assumes that 
the  technology  has  constant  returns  to scale. In  particular,  the calculation 
excludes the possibility  of increasing  returns  in general  or fixed costs of 
any kind;  that is, it excludes the possibility that the firm  operates most 
of the time on a decreasing  portion  of its average  cost curve. 
The basic finding  is that profit  is nowhere  near  as high  as it would be 
under full exploitation of market power with constant returns. My 
interpretation  is that firms  face setup costs, advertising  costs, or fixed 
vol. 43  (June  1976),  pp.  217-35;  and  Avinash  K. Dixit  and  Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "Monopolistic 
Competition  and  Optimum  Product  Diversity,"  American Economic Review, vol. 67  (June 
1977),  pp. 297-308. Robert E. Hall  301 
costs that absorb a good part of the latent monopoly profit. In this 
interpretation,  firms  frequently  operate on the decreasing  portions of 
their average cost curves. Marginal  cost is consequently well below 
average  cost, and  zero or low levels of actual  pure  profit  are the result. 
I retain  the approach  to the measurement  of market  power set forth 
in  the previous  section. It has  the convenient  property  that  market  power 
is expressed  as the ratio  of price to marginal  cost. Once marginal  cost is 
known, then the profit-maximizing  price is known  directly;  my analysis 
does not need to go through  the steps of profit  maximization.  Similarly, 
the optimal level of employment is already implicit in the analysis. 
However, the third  dimension  of optimization,  the choice of the capital 
stock, now has to be considered  explicitly. 
Let uT  be the actual  rate  of pure  profit  relative  to sales: 
pQ  -  wN  -  rK 
PQ 
where rK is the annual service cost of the capital stock. Under the 
hypothesis of zero expected pure profit, uT  would be a purely random 
element,  sometimes  positive  and  sometimes  negative.  On  the  other  hand, 
if a firm  could exercise its full monopoly power and choose its capital 
stock subject to a constant-returns-to-scale  technology, then IT would 
be substantially  positive, on the average.  To see how big it would  be, we 
must  consider  the firm's  optimal  choice of capital. 
The characterization  of the cost-minimizing  choice of capital  under 
constant  returns  is remarkably  simple. Think  of the firm  as divided  into 
a marketing  department  and a production  department.  Marketing  takes 
no inputs. Production sells to marketing  at a transfer  price equal to 
marginal  cost. If production  has chosen its capital stock optimally,  the 
pure profit  of the production  department  will be zero on the average. 
That  is, the quantity 
xQ -  wN-  rK 
Trp  - 
PQ 
should  be a purely  random  element with zero mean. I call urp  the firm's 
"production  profit.  " The other  part  of the firm's  total profit  is 
TM =  1r -  Ip 
=  (p  -x)/p 
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which I call "marketing  profit." A properly run firm producing  with 
constant returns  to scale has production  profit  that averages  zero over 
the cycle-production just covers the annual  carrying  cost of its capital 
stock. Its marketing  department  generates all of its pure profit, as 
measured by SM.  By contrast, a firm in the situation described by 
Chamberlin,  with zero pure  profit,  will generate  a substantial  amount  of 
marketing  profit  but  will lose the corresponding  amount  in its production 
department.  That is, urp  will be sufficiently  negative to offset the profit 
generated  by marketing.  A competitive  firm  will have no pure profit  in 
either  the marketing  or the production  departments. 
In this section, I will simply  compute  total profit  and its two compo- 
nents, based  on the estimates  of market  power  from  the previous  section. 
That is,  I will compute total profit directly from the data, impute 
marketing  profit  by inserting  the earlier  estimates of the markup  ratio, 
I,  into the formula for uTM  just derived,  and then calculate the profit of 
the production  department  as the difference between total profit and 
marketing  profit. This procedure does not try to deal fully with the 
statistical  reliability  of the decomposition,  but  other  work  of mine  shows 
that  the estimates  of production  profit  are quite  reliable.9 
Because the imputation  of marketing  profit  is entirely  dependent  on 
the earlier  estimation  of the markup  coefficient, [,  there is no point in 
trying  to make  the calculations  for  this section  except for  those industries 
in which there is enough  cyclical movement  in employment  and output 
to identify  the markup.  Hence, the results  in this section are confined  to 
those industries  in the top part  of table 1 for which the standard  error  of 
the estimate  of > was 1.0 or smaller. 
Data.  All the data for these calculations are the same as in the 
previous section except for one added series, the rental  price of capital 
(r in the formulas  above). Briefly,  I computed  the rental  price according 
to the Hall-Jorgenson  formula,  using the dividend  yield of the Standard 
and Poor's 500 as the real interest rate. I obtained values for the 
depreciation  rate, the effective investment  tax credit rate, and present 
discounted  value of depreciation  deductions  from  Jorgenson  and Sulli- 
van, and the value for the deflator  for business fixed investment  from 
the national  income and  product  accounts.  10 
9.  Robert E. Hall, "Chronic Excess  Capacity in U.S.  Industry," Working Paper 1973 
(National Bureau of Economic  Research, July 1986). 
10.  Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson,  "Tax Policy and Investment  Behavior," 
American Economic  Review,  vol.  57 (June 1967), pp. 391-414;  Dale W. Jorgenson and Robert E. Hall  303 
Results.  Table  2 shows the decomposition  of pure  profit  per dollar  of 
sales for the twenty-eight  relevant industries. The first column shows 
total profit  on the average over the period, together  with the standard 
error  of the estimate of the average. In all but the regulated  industries, 
total pure  profit  per dollar  of sales is positive and usually exceeds zero 
by many standard  errors.  A number  of industries  earn  20 cents or more 
in pure  profit  for each dollar  of sales. The hypothesis  of strict  zero profit 
is rejected  by the data. However, this rejection  is subject  to a number  of 
qualifications.  All earnings  of the firms  not paid  out as compensation  are 
treated as profit or the return to capital. The returns to the firm's 
investments  in human  capital,  research  and  development,  and advertis- 
ing  are  included  in profit.  However, another  accounting  convention  goes 
in the opposite direction-the  costs of these investments  are deducted 
from  profit  in the year the investments  are made. Profit  is overstated  for 
slowly growing  firms  whose current  investment  falls short  of the return 
earned  from  past investment  and  understated  for quickly  growing  ones. 
The profit calculations  also overstate profit slightly because of the 
omission of inventories from the capital stock. I have been able to 
calculate the current  market  value of inventories  for about half of the 
industries  covered in table  2. Profit  per  dollar  of value added  is generally 
about 4 cents less than the numbers  in table 2 when the service cost of 
inventories  is subtracted  from  revenue. 
The third column shows the marketing  profit per dollar of sales. 
Marketing  profit  is a simple  increasing  function  of the markup  coefficient, 
1TM =  1  -  1I/.  The  fourth  column  then computes  production  profit  as the 
residual.  Production  profit  is invariably  negative for firms  with market 
power, sometimes substantially  negative. Not surprisingly,  the biggest 
production  losses occur in regulated  industries.  But chemicals, paper, 
primary  metals, trucking,  and stone, clay, and  glass all have production 
losses in excess of 30 cents per dollar  of value added. 
Production  profits  are negative  because firms  are unable  to minimize 
costs by making  a free choice of the scale of their productive units. 
Instead, many of their units are "too big" because they are at the 
minimum  practical scale. Together with their associated marketing 
departments,  they cover their  costs, so they are  reasonable  investments. 
Martin  A. Sullivan,  "Inflation  and Corporate  Capital  Recovery," in Charles  R. Hulten, 
ed., Depreciation, Inflation, and the Taxation of Income from Capital (Washington, D.C.: 
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However, they do not typically operate anywhere near their physical 
capacities. 
QUALIFICATIONS  AND  POTENTIAL  SOURCES  OF  BIAS 
The  fact  that  drives  all  of my  results  is well known  and  uncontroversial: 
for  many  industries  and  all  broad  aggregates,  output  can  rise substantially 
with only a modest increase in measured  labor input. All measures of 
Table 2.  Decomposition of Profit per Dollar of Value Added,  1949-78a 
Profit  per dollar 
SIC  Standard  Market-  Markup 
code  Industry  Total  error  ingb  Productionc  ratio 
Substantial  market  power 
28  Chemicals  0.22  0.013  0.71  -0.49  3.39 
26  Paper  0.14  0.009  0.63  -0.49  2.68 
40  Railroad  transportation  -0.30  0.011  0.58  -0.88  2.38 
44  Water  transportation  -0.36  0.018  0.54  -0.90  2.16 
371  Motor  vehicles  0.33  0.023  0.52  -0.19  2.07 
33  Primary  metals  0.07  0.016  0.51  -0.45  2.06 
42  Trucking  and warehousing  0.20  0.005  0.51  -0.31  2.06 
Some market  power 
32  Stone, clay, and glass  0.12  0.011  0.45  -0.32  1.81 
11  Coal mining  0.17  0.018  0.40  -0.24  1.68 
27  Printing  and publishing  0.15  0.004  0.38  -0.23  1.61 
76  Repair  0.31  0.230  0.38  -0.07  1.60 
31  Leather  0.09  0.006  0.37  -0.28  1.59 
70  Hotels and lodging  0.09  0.013  0.37  -0.28  1.59 
39  Miscellaneous  0.16  0.006  0.34  -0.19  1.52 
36  Electrical  machinery  0.15  0.010  0.30  -0.15  1.43 
48  Communications  -0.01  0.015  0.30  -0.31  1.43 
30  Rubber  0.16  0.010  0.29  -0.13  1.41 
35  Nonelectrical  machinery  0.15  0.007  0.28  -0.13  1.39 
34  Fabricated  metals  0.10  0.006  0.28  -0.18  1.39 
25  Furniture  0.12  0.007  0.28  -0.15  1.38 
23  Apparel  0.11  0.003  0.23  -0.13  1.30 
38  Instruments  0.15  0.010  0.22  -0.07  1.29 
95  Total nondurables  0.21  0.006  0.38  -0.17  1.61 
96  Total  durables  0.15  0.009  0.38  -0.23  1.62 
Little ,narket  power 
15  Construction  0.24  0.003  0.10  0.14  1.11 
22  Textiles  0.07  0.009  0.05  0.02  1.05 
24  Lumber  0.21  0.007  0.00  0.21  1.00 
7  Agricultural  services  - 2.90  0.198  -0.09  - 2.81  0.92 
372  Other  transportation  equipment  0.01  0.015  -0.10  0.11  0.91 
62  Security  and  commodity  brokers  0.30  0.019  -0.79  1.09  0.56 
Source:  Author's  estimates  as described  in text. 
a.  For those  industries  in the top  part of  table  1, where  the  standard error of the  estimated  markup was  1.0 or 
smaller. 
b.  Calculated as an increasing function of the markup coefficient,  1TM  ]  -  1/p. 
c.  Residual of total profit per dollar and marketing profit per dollar. Figures are rounded. Robert E. Hall  305 
productivity,  from  the simplest  measure  of output  per employee-hour  to 
the most sophisticated  computation  of total factor  productivity,  show a 
pronounced  cycle that  tracks  the movements  in employment  and  output. 
My work amounts to a new interpretation  of this established fact; it 
attributes  procyclical  productivity  to the existence of market  power. As 
I have already noted, existing explanations of the procyclicality of 
productivity,  such as the hypotheses of labor hoarding  and overhead 
labor,  also presuppose  noncompetitive  behavior  and so are harmonious 
with my explanation. 
There is not much doubt, as a matter of economic analysis, that 
market  power distorts  the total factor productivity  calculations  recom- 
mended  by Solow. Solow's basic idea was to subtract  from the growth 
of output  the part  that could be explained  by the growth  of labor  input. 
He used a market  measure of the marginal  product of labor, the real 
wage, to provide the coefficient to put in front of labor growth in that 
calculation.  Under  competition,  the real  wage is a proper  measure  of the 
marginal  product.  But with market  power, the real  wage understates  the 
marginal  product  of labor. Hence, Solow's calculation  makes too small 
an adjustment  for changing  labor  input  in the presence  of market  power. 
In an expansion, output rises by more than can be explained by the 
increase  in labor  input.  Measured  productivity  rises in the expansion. 
The strong  assumption  that I make  is that all of the cyclical behavior 
of total factor productivity  is the result of the understatement  of the 
marginal  product  of labor on account of market  power. I exclude any 
other  factor  that  does not operate  through  market  power. Here I list and 
discuss other  explanations  that  I reject  by assumption. 
-Productivityfluctuations  as a driving  force  in the business cycle 
Fluctuations  in productivity  have been central  to the effort  of the real 
business cycle school to find an explanation  for aggregate  fluctuations 
that does not rest on price-wage rigidity, market imperfections, or 
misperceptions  about  the state of the economy. The real  business cycle 
school tries to use the same basic microeconomic principles that an 
economist  would  normally  invoke to explain  the ups and  downs of, say, 
onion  production.  Aggregate  output  is set by the intersection  of a supply 
function  and a demand  function; the prices mediating  the two are the 
real interest rate and the real wage."I  A favorable productivity shift 
11. See Martin  Eichenbaum  and  Kenneth  J. Singleton,  "Do Equilibrium  Real  Business 
Cycle  Theories  Explain  Postwar  U.S. Business Cycles?" in Stanley  Fischer, ed., NBER 
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makes  output  rise;  the public  perceives  a boom. In some other  year  when 
productivity  was unusually  low, the opposite would happen  and people 
would complain  of a recession. 
In an economy with numerous  industries, the productivity  shocks 
would have to be economywide  to create meaningful  aggregate  fluctua- 
tions. Were  that  not so and  each  of fifty  industries  had  its own  independent 
shock, the law of large numbers  would make aggregate  GNP almost 
immune  from fluctuations  driven  by those shocks. In considering  what 
types of productivity  shocks might  provide a competitive explanation 
for the findings  of this paper, it is essential to restrict  consideration  to 
those shocks that operate in tandem across industries  and to rule out 
innovations  whose contributions  are limited  to particular  industries. 
One  obvious  common  influence  is the  weather.  However, the industry 
most affected  by weather,  agriculture,  is almost  unique  in having  output 
fluctuations  that are completely  uncorrelated  with total GNP (see table 
3 and the discussion that follows). The hypothesis that weather is an 
important  driving  force for total GNP surely  faces an uphill  battle with 
the data.  12 
I am also skeptical  that process innovation  has an important  role in 
aggregate  fluctuations. Even if an episode of rapid growth could be 
traced to the sudden adoption of improved technology, what about 
contractions  in output?  Are they periods when businesses throughout 
the economy choose  simultaneously to  abandon the most efficient 
methods? 
The only problem with dismissing technology shocks as a driving 
force for aggregate  output  is that  there  must be some driving  force-the 
economy does have important  fluctuations.  If the driving  force is not 
technology, it must  be shifts in preferences,  government  policies, terms 
of trade,  and  other  determinants  of economic activity. One could be  just 
as scornful  about  the idea that  there  are spontaneous  shifts in consump- 
tion or that investment  is driven in part by animal  spirits. But some of 
these forces must drive the cycle, or there would be no recessions and 
no booms. 
-The  wage does not control the allocation  of labor 
A fundamental  hypothesis of my work is that the reported wage 
governs  the firm's  choice of labor  input.  The firm  is seen as a price-taker 
12. Research in progress by Jeffrey Miron has shown directly that fluctuations  in 
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in the labor  market.  One alternative  interpretation  of my results is that 
firms have extensive monopsony power; they hire workers up to the 
point that the marginal  compensation  cost equals the marginal  revenue 
product  of labor. Under monopsony, marginal  compensation  cost will 
exceed the wage. Solow's productivity calculation will go off track 
because it uses the reported wage, not the higher level of marginal 
compensation cost,  to infer the marginal  product of labor. On this 
interpretation,  my results show that the labor market  is imperfect,  not 
that  the product  market  is imperfect. 
In an economy where the majority  of people work in labor markets 
with thousands  of employers,  and  few workers  are highly  specialized  in 
the type of work uniquely available from their employer, it seems 
implausible  that  monopsony  power in its standard  sense has much  to do 
with my findings.  Of more concern is the monopsony  power that arises 
in the dealings  of a firm  with its established,  long-term  employees. That 
topic  has  been  studied  at  length  in  the  literature  on employment  contracts. 
Under a long-term  contract, it cannot be taken for granted  that the 
wage set by the contract  has anything  to do with the cost of increasing 
labor  input. The majority  of American  workers  are paid by salary, and 
it is virtually  the definition  of a salary that compensation  is the same 
amount each pay period independent  of the actual amount of work. 
Salaried  workers  are expected to work harder  and longer  when there is 
more  work to do. Of course, there must be some implicit  cost of asking 
the existing  work  force to put in more  hours, or management  would ask 
them to work harder  all the time. The typical salaried  job involves an 
implicit or explicit arrangement  whereby weeks with extra hours are 
balanced by short weeks or time off. In addition, those who put in 
extraordinary  hours  are more  likely to earn  raises. 
As it happens,  uncompensated  fluctuations  in work effort are not an 
important  problem  for  my  calculations,  provided  that  the  average  amount 
of compensation  correctly  measures  the implicit  wage. Contract  theory 
suggests that, on the average, the two should  be equal. The firm  should 
be indifferent  whether  to ask for more effort  from  its existing staff or to 
add new staff. The latter cost is just the average amount of compen- 
sation. 
Average  hourly  compensation  probably  differs  from  the true implicit 
cost of labor  over the cycle, understating  the true  cost in good years and 
overstating  it in poor years. However, a cyclical bias has no impact  on 308  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
Table 3.  Statistics on the Rate of Change of Output by Industry,  1949-78 
Correlation 
with 
SIC  Standard  Serial  cyclical 
code  Industry  deviation  correlation  industries 
Meaningful  estimatesa 
Substantial  market power 
28  Chemicals  0.053  -  0.318  0.795 
26  Paper  0.082  -0.177  0.701 
40  Railroad  transportation  0.074  - 0.074  0.788 
44  Water  transportation  0.110  - 0.193  0.459 
371  Motor  vehicles  0.195  -0.381  0.743 
33  Primary  metals  0.126  -0.284  0.871 
42  Trucking  and warehousing  0.057  -0.143  0.764 
Some  market power 
32  Stone, clay, and glass  0.067  -0.243  0.847 
11  Coal mining  0.095  -0.166  0.463 
27  Printing  and publishing  0.034  0.067  0.533 
76  Repair  0.039  0.122  0.216 
31  Leather  0.077  - 0.425  0.686 
70  Hotels and lodging  0.038  -0.072  0.365 
39  Miscellaneous  0.052  - 0.400  0.765 
36  Electrical  machinery  0.089  0.119  0.881 
48  Communications  0.020  - 0.250  0.426 
30  Rubber  0.092  - 0.044  0.861 
35  Nonelectrical  machinery  0.092  0.057  0.766 
34  Fabricated  metals  0.077  -0.090  0.945 
25  Furniture  0.090  - 0.222  0.799 
23  Apparel  0.053  0.061  0.759 
38  Instruments  0.073  0.127  0.804 
95  Total nondurables  0.038  - 0.111  0.888 
96  Total durables  0.083  -0.102  0.987 
Little market power 
15  Construction  0.051  0.211  0.709 
22  Textiles  0.074  0.126  0.640 
24  Lumber  0.085  0.103  0.622 
7  Agricultural  services  0.052  -0.281  0.313 
372  Other  transportation  equipment  0.125  0.590  0.417 
62  Security  and  commodity  brokers  0.067  0.334  0.273 
Unreliable estimatesb 
10  Metal mining  0.108  - 0.370  0.443 
45  Air transportation  0.065  0.445  0.613 
483  Radio  and TV broadcasting  0.065  0.116  0.127 
78  Motion  pictures  0.068  0.232  0.270 
20  Food and beverages  0.033  -0.212  0.554 Robert E. Hall  309 
my calculations.  13  Although  the first  differences  of output  and  labor  input 
are  the essential  input  to the calculations,  it is only the level of the wage, 
as it appears  in labor's share, x, that matters. A cyclical error in x is 
unimportant.  Suppose  that  the error  is procyclical,  as suggested  above. 
In strong  years, employment  growth  is positive, the growth  of real  GNP 
is positive, and the error  is positive. Their  product  is positive. In weak 
years, all three components  are negative, and the product  is negative. 
The net contribution  of the error  to my calculations  is zero, because the 
weak years offset the strong  years. 
-Other  cyclical errors 
The same argument  applies to any error whose influence on my 
calculations is  only to  introduce a cyclical error in labor's share. 
Adjustment  costs for labor  are a good example. With  adjustment  costs, 
half  the time the firm  sees the marginal  cost of increasing  labor  input  as 
above the wage (when growth is high) and the other half of the time it 
sees the marginal  cost of increasing  labor input as less than the wage, 
Table 3. (continued) 
Correlation 
with 
SIC  Standard  Serial  cyclical 
code  Industry  deviation  correlation  industries 
21  Tobacco  0.051  -0.087  -0.028 
52  Retail trade  0.028  -0.140  0.734 
50  Wholesale  trade  0.030  -0.145  0.726 
81  Legal services  0.042  0.113  -0.033 
75  Auto repair  0.048  0.122  0.547 
41  Local and interurban transit  0.048  0.213  0.246 
79  Amusement  0.031  0.301  0.160 
61  Credit agencies  0.030  0.487  0.496 
49  Utilities  0.032  0.145  0.169 
13  Oil and gas extraction  0.039  0.090  0.661 
64  Insurance agents  0.029  0.041  0.559 
1  Farms  0.034  -  0.503  -  0.380 
14  Nonmetallic  minerals  0.051  -0.126  0.777 
46  Pipelines  0.051  0.210  0.651 
73  Business  services  0.035  0.059  0.519 
Source:  Author's  estimates  as described  in text. 
a.  Standard error of the estimate  of the markup ratio, ,u, is  1.0 or smaller. 
b.  Industries with too little cyclical  variation to measure the markup ratio. 
13. See Hall, "Relation  between Price and Marginal  Cost," pp. 36-41, for a formal 
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because of the saving  in downward  adjustment  costs. Another  example 
of a benign cyclical error is price rigidity that is not associated with 
market  power. If the price  is less flexible  than  the competitive  price, but 
the two are equal  on the average, then the only result is a cyclical error 
in labor's  share,  and  that  has no impact  on my conclusions  about  market 
power. 
-Errors  in measuring labor input 
The same argument  that shows the irrelevance  of cyclical errors in 
labor's share also demonstrates  the sensitivity of my calculations to 
cyclical errors in measuring labor input. Suppose that the error in 
measuring  hours is negative  in strong  years and positive in weak years. 
Then  its product  with  the growth  of GNP will be negative  in strong  years 
(when the error is negative and the change in GNP is positive) and 
negative  in weak years  as well (when  the error  is positive and  the change 
in GNP is negative). The strength  of the association of the change in 
labor  input  with the change  in GNP will be understated.  My estimate  of 
the markup  ratio, [,  is the ratio of the covariance of output and GNP 
changes to the covariance  of labor input and GNP changes. That ratio 
will be overstated  in the presence of cyclical errors  in measuring  labor 
input. 
Two types of cyclical errors in measuring  labor input are possible; 
they both create the same bias. First, fluctuations  in reported  hours of 
work may understate  actual fluctuations  in hours, because firms and 
workers report a standard  forty-hour  week and not their actual, more 
variable  work  week. My data  on hours  of work  use all available  sources 
to measure  actual  hours. In particular,  the national  income and product 
accounts use  the Bureau of  Labor Statistics' household survey to 
measure  the hours  of nonproduction  workers.  However, it is likely that 
there  is some element  of cyclical  understatement  of fluctuations  in hours. 
The second type of cyclical error  escapes measurement  altogether- 
fluctuations in the intensity of work effort. One dimension of  the 
proposition  that people work harder  when there is more work to do is 
that  they get more  done per hour  of work in the peak than  in the trough. 
It should not be taken for granted,  however, that this phenomenon  is 
quantitatively  large. It is less persuasive on the downside: in a slump, 
why would people want to keep coming to work for their usual hours 
and  accomplish  less per hour,  when they could enjoy more  time at home 
by working  as hard  as usual, but spending  fewer hours  at work?  Even in Robert E. Hall  311 
normal  times, they face the same  opportunity,  to work  closer to capacity 
and  spend  fewer  hours  at work, or, for that  matter,  to work  normal  hours 
and  earn  more. 
The  only study  I know  that  has  examined  work  effort  over  the business 
cycle finds  a small  increase, not a decrease, during  a slump.  Jon Fay and 
James Medoff surveyed almost 200 managers  of manufacturing  plants 
and  asked  whether  the work  effort  of blue-collar  workers  changed  during 
a large  cyclical contraction.  A slight  majority  said effort  increased.  14 
Lessons for Macroeconomics 
The results developed here have implications  for several important 
issues in macroeconomics. They add to our understanding  of why 
measured productivity varies cyclically; they demonstrate  that eco- 
nomic supply or capacity can be highly elastic; and they explain why 
market forces provide no strong tendency to move the economy to 
high-employment  levels of operation. 
CYCLICAL  PRODUCTIVITY 
At a minimum,  macroeconomists  should  be aware  that  market  power 
may have an important  role in explaining  cyclical fluctuations  in meas- 
ured  productivity.  None of my work  tests the alternative  hypothesis  that 
cyclical fluctuations  in productivity  are an exogenous driving  force in a 
competitive  model. Rather,  I assume that there is no important  pattern 
of true productivity  shifts common across industries  that create reces- 
sions and booms. Those macroeconomists  who believe, as I do, that 
productivity  changes do not drive the business cycle should  be at least 
partly  convinced that noncompetitive  conditions explain cyclical fluc- 
tuations  in measured  productivity  as a response  to changes  in the forces 
that  cause recessions and  booms. 
Labor hoarding is an important ingredient in the explanation of 
why small fluctuations  in employment accompany large fluctuations 
in output. A competitive firm is unlikely to let its work force remain 
14. Jon A. Fay and James  L. Medoff, "Labor  and Output  Over  the Business Cycle: 
Some Direct Evidence,"  American Economic Review, vol. 75 (September 1985), pp. 638- 
55. 312  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
idle. It can sell added output without depressing the price. Unless 
the price is so low that it cannot cover the cost of materials,  the firm 
can make added profit by putting all of its workers to work. But a 
firm with market  power may well hoard workers during  a temporary 
downturn, because the alternative  of dumping  output on the market 
is unattractive  on account of its depressing effect on price. 
CAPACITY  CONSTRAINTS 
Another  important  implication  of my findings  is that it is physically 
possible for aggregate  supply to be highly elastic. In the equilibrium  I 
described  in the first part of the paper, numerous  firms  inhabit  market 
niches with surplus  capacity  because the constraint  of minimum  scale is 
binding.  Each is capable  of increasing  output  above its normal  level by 
hiring  only a little new labor. Because price far exceeds marginal  cost, 
the increment  to GNP from the added output will be worth more than 
the added wage cost. The output of the economy is constrained by 
demand  in this type of equilibrium.  An episode such as a major  war or a 
dramatic,  prolonged  monetary  stimulus  can draw  forth huge increases 
in GNP. 
If some stimulus-fiscal, monetary,  or other-raises demand  in a way 
that is expected to be long-lasting,  even more capacity  will be created. 
Higher  demand  will raise profit  in existing niches, stimulating  the entry 
of new capacity in them, and will also make new niches sufficiently 
profitable  for exploitation.  In the new equilibrium,  expected profit  will 
be zero once again,  but at a higher  level of total capacity. 
INCENTIVES  TO  EXPAND  TO  FULL  EMPLOYMENT 
Perhaps  the most  important  implication  of excess capacity  and  market 
power  in many  industries  is that  businesses have little or no incentive to 
expand  to full capacity. A number  of theoretical  models have made  this 
point recently. Oliver  Hart's model of general  equilibrium  with market 
power posits market  power in both product  markets  and labor  markets 
and  a single  equilibrium  in which  output  and  employment  are  below their 
competitive  levels.'5 In Hart's model, economic activity is sensitive to 
15. Oliver Hart, "A Mqdel of Imperfect  Competition  with Keynesian Features," 
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government  interventions  that  would have little impact  in a competitive 
economy. Procompetitive  government  policies that would increase the 
number  of sellers in each product market would increase output and 
welfare. Hart's work offsets earlier partial equilibrium  analysis that 
concluded that the welfare costs of market power were only small 
Harberger  triangles  summing  to a fraction  of a percent  of GNP. 
Walter  P. Heller's more recent work considers a related  model with 
a multiplicity  of equilibria.'6  One of the equilibria  is similar  to Hart's. 
Others  involve even lower output. There  is no obvious economic force 
that  will take  the economy  from  its poorer  equilibria  to the best one. And 
even the best one has lower output  than  does competition. 
There is  a tremendous gap between the theoretical models just 
described  and the actual U.S. economy. Rather  than  discuss any more 
elaborate  general  equilibrium  models, I want to consider some features 
of partial equilibrium  with excess  capacity and market power at a 
somewhat  more  practical  level. In particular,  I will examine  the issue of 
the incentives  that  a firm  perceives to expand  output  when it is below its 
equilibrium  output. I will enlarge upon an idea first advanced in the 
"small menu  costs" literature,  which has argued  that  prices are rigid  in 
response to small changes in market conditions.'7  When a firm with 
market  power sets a price to maximize  profit, it picks the price where 
profit is locally unaffected by small changes in the price-the  curve 
showing  profit  as a function  of price  is flat  at its maximum.  Consequently, 
within some region, the firm cannot improve its profit by enough to 
justify even small costs of changing  its price. It keeps its price at its 
previous  level even though  new conditions  wouldjustify  a different  price 
if the change  were costless. 
paper  is Martin  L. Weitzman,  "Increasing  Returns  and  the Foundations  of Unemployment 
Theory,"  Economic  Journal,  vol. 92 (December  1982),  pp. 787-804. 
16. Walter  P. Heller, "Coordination  Failure  under  Complete  Markets  with Applica- 
tions  to Effective  Demand"  (University  of California,  San  Diego, August  1985). 
17. George  A. Akerlof  and  Janet  L. Yellen, "A Near-Rational  Model  of the Business 
Cycle, with Wage  and Price  Inertia,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 100  (supple- 
ment, 1985),  pp. 823-38; Olivier  J. Blanchard  and Nobuhiro  Kiyotaki, "Monopolistic 
Competition,  Aggregate  Demand  Externalities  and Real Effects of Nominal Money," 
Working  Paper  1770  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  December  1985);  N. Gregory 
Mankiw,  "Small  Menu  Costs and Large  Business Cycles: A Macroeconomic  Model of 
Monopoly,"  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol.  100 (May 1985), pp. 529-39;  and Julio 
J. Rotemberg  and  Garth  Saloner,  "The  Relative  Rigidity  of Monopoly  Pricing,"  Working 
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The  literature  on small  menu  costs has  considered  the  relation  between 
price and profit, because the firm with market power is  normally 
considered as setting a price and meeting the demand  forthcoming  at 
that  price. However, the principal  task of macroeconomics,  in my view, 
is to explain  the behavior  of output,  not prices. Price  rigidity  is significant 
to the extent that it brings about excessive fluctuations  in output, not 
because prices are  intrinsically  important.  Hence, it is important  to look 
at the relation  between  profit  and  output.  In  doing  so, I am  not suggesting 
that  firms  consider  output  to be their  control  variable.  Rather,  I continue 
to assume  that  firms  set prices  and  let their  customers  choose the quantity 
sold, but I look at the implications  in terms of the resulting  relation 
between output  and profit.  It turns  out that for a broad  class of circum- 
stances, that  relation  is extremely  flat. 
When a firm finds itself out of equilibrium,  with a level of output 
different from the profit-maximizing  one,  the incentive to make an 
adjustment  depends on the flatness of the output-profit  curve. The 
flatness  depends,  in turn,  on the degree  of market  power-that is, on the 
elasticity of demand facing the seller, on the way that the elasticity 
changes  with output,  and  on the shape  of the marginal  cost curve. 
Constancy of Marginal Cost.  Here I will demonstrate a proposition 
that  is central  to the view put  forth  in this  paper:  an  industry  that  achieves 
its equilibrium  along  a flat  portion  of the marginal  cost curves of its firms 
is more likely to have a nearly indeterminate  equilibrium  than is an 
industry  at equilibrium  along  a rising  portion  of the marginal  cost curve. 
Consider  a firm  facing  given factor  prices  and  stable  behavior  on the part 
of its rivals. The firm is thinking  about alternative  levels of its own 
output, achieved by setting different  prices. If the firm's  marginal  cost 
schedule is steep, an increase in output moves the firm into a region 
where cost rises more steeply with output  and  hence profit  falls rapidly. 
The maximum  of profit is well defined. On the other hand, with flat 
marginal  cost, only the decline in marginal  revenue makes profit  begin 
to decline as output  rises above the point where profit  is maximized. 
What  type of industry  achieves equilibrium  with its firms  operating 
along flat parts of their marginal  cost schedules? I will argue that this 
outcome is much more likely in Chamberlinian  equilibrium  than in 
competition,  though  it is not inevitably  a feature  of the Chamberlinian 
equilibrium.  A competitive  industry  generates  an expected return  high 
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equilibrium,  so that demand  occasionally presses against  capacity and 
high prices are the result. Absent these periods of scarcity pricing, 
revenue would cover only variable costs, and capital would earn an 
inadequate  return.  On the other hand, when firms  have market  power 
in equilibrium,  the profit  derived from that power is itself an attractor 
of capital.  Periods  of scarcity  pricing  only add  to the attraction  of invest- 
ment  in the industry.  It is perfectly  possible  for equilibrium  to occur  with 
sufficient  underutilized  capital  that  output  never enters  a region  of rising 
marginal  cost. To summarize,  constant  marginal  cost is an impossibility 
under competition, because it cannot generate the revenue to pay for 
the capital stock, but constant marginal  cost is completely consistent 
with  an  equilibrium  with  market  power. Hence a finding  of market  power 
points  in the direction  of constant  marginal  cost. 
In my findings  in the first  part  of this paper, competition  is ruled  out 
for  industries  with  markup  ratios  substantially  above 1. While  the results 
are consistent with the explanation  I have just given for flat marginal 
cost, the argument  is not conclusive. There  are alternative  explanations 
for the findings  of market  power with little profit, and not all of them 
require  that marginal  cost be flat. For example, suppose that an adver- 
tising campaign  is needed to establish  brand-name  recognition  in order 
to enter the industry.  The technology has constant  returns  to scale and 
there is no minimum  practical  scale. The equilibrium  will not involve 
excess capacity and a level of output  on a flat part  of the marginal  cost 
schedule. Instead, all of the latent profit from market  power will be 
dissipated  by advertising  a sufficiently  large  number  of products. 
My results  to date support  the hypothesis  that  the marginal  cost curve 
is flat but are also consistent with noncompetitive  alternatives.  Unfor- 
tunately,  a direct  empirical  attack  on the problem  is difficult  because of 
the cyclical measurement  errors that are likely to pervade the data. 
These errors  have a benign  effect on my measures  of market  power and 
profitability,  but stand  in the way of measuring  the slope of the marginal 
cost schedule. 
Implications of Constant Marginal Cost.  The findings of the first part 
of this paper  are consistent  with an industry  equilibrium  along  a flat  part 
of the marginal  cost schedule of each firm. In order to draw out the 
implications of  constant marginal cost,  I  will make the additional 
assumption that the demand schedule perceived by each firm has 
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different elasticities. Each curve is labeled with its elasticity, e; the 
corresponding  markup,  pR,  is related by pR  =  1/(1  -  1/e).  Profit  is most 
sensitive to output  when the elasticity  of demand  is around  2. The curve 
for  e  2 shows that  profit  falls short  of its maximum  by about  0.6 percent 
of value added when output is 20 percent below its optimum  and by 
about  0.5 percent  when output  is 20 percent  too high. Even in this worst 
case, profit  is hardly  sensitive to output  deviations of 20 percent. And 
when market  power  is either  greater  (e  =  1.3  or 1.05)  or smaller  (e  =  10  or 
50), profit falls short of its maximum  by only one or two tenths of a 
percent  of value added  for output  deviations  of 20 percent. 
Figure 1 measures lost profit in relation to  value added. Other 
normalizations  might  generate  larger  percentages,  but it is important  to 
understand  how the normalizations  differ. In particular,  normalization 
by the value of profit  itself is problematical.  Profit  is zero on the average 
in competitive  industries  and I have argued  that it is fairly  close to zero 
even with market power because of the process of entry. Hence a 
normalization  by pure profit  would not make sense. Normalization  by 
the total earnings  of capital,  which are between a quarter  and a third  of 
value added, would triple  or quadruple  the percentages  shown in figure 
1, but they would still be very small. 
The case of constant  elasticity  of demand  is no more  than  illustrative. 
The elasticity of demand  can decrease with output or it can increase. 
The  linear  demand  curve  is an example  in which  the elasticity  of demand 
is higher  at points  of high  price  and  low quantity.  And  any demand  curve 
that intersects the vertical axis has at least a region where elasticity 
decreases with output. When elasticity increases mildly with output, 
profit  is even less sensitive to output  than it is in the case of a constant 
elasticity. There are good reasons to think  that elasticity may increase 
with output for many products. Suppose that a product is sold to a 
number of groups of customers and the groups have different, but 
constant,  elasticities.  Then  the total  demand  for  the product  must  exhibit 
increasing elasticity. As price falls, the demands of the more elastic 
groups increase as a fraction of total demand. The elasticity of total 
demand  is the weighted average of the elasticities of the groups, so it 
must rise when the more elastic groups are a larger  part of the total. 
When  elasticity  increases  with output  at  just the right  rate, profit  will be 
perfectly flat for a range of levels of output. That is, it is possible for 
marginal  revenue  to be a constant  corresponding  with marginal  cost. 
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marginal  cost is that the incentive to set exactly the profit-maximizing 
price and produce  exactly the corresponding  quantity  is weak and may 
even be absent when the elasticity of demand  is constant or increases 
with output.  Output  can be nearly  indeterminate  over a wide range  with 
the right  curvature  of the demand  schedule. 
With  indeterminacy,  a firm  perceives  itself  as capturing  a fixed  amount 
of profit  no matter  what its price and output  are. Even if indeterminacy 
doe's  not hold, the incremental  profit  from adjusting  output  by, say, 10 
percent,  is tiny. In  businesses  with  the  flat  marginal  cost curves  suggested 
by my results, fine-tuning  output  and  price  is not a matter  of priority  for 
management.  Managers  perceive  that  lowering  a price  will raise  volume, 
but they also know that the volume and price effects will cancel each 
other to a first approximation.  Other areas of management,  such as 
better  products, more effective promotion,  and reduction  in overhead 
and production costs,  receive  higher priority because there is  no 
automatic  offset to their benefits. 
Figure 1.  Profit and Output with Constant Marginal Costa 
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Everyday economic life is full of examples of near-indeterminacy 
at work. In most communities  today, the prices of essentially identical 
gasoline at neighboring  stations can differ by several cents a gallon. 
Dispersion in  prices persists for  months, but  the  pattern is  not 
permanent. Chevron was once at the top of the distribution,  but is 
now near  the bottom. Stations  with low prices do vastly more  business, 
but their  profit  per gallon  is enough  less that  they are no more  profitable 
than the high-priced  ones. Indeterminacy  of quantity seems the only 
reasonable explanation. A condominium  in Maui has raised its daily 
rate 10 dollars each year for the past seven years, quite heedless of 
what has happened  to other rates or to the general  state of the market. 
The occupancy rate is down considerably,  but the owners are satisfied 
that they could not earn more (or less) by bringing  their rate back to 
its historical relation to other rates. During the Great Depression, 
International  Nickel, then a monopoly, did not bother to change the 
dollar price of nickel for eight full years, in spite of large reductions 
in costs and output. 
Time  Series Implications. This line of thought  implies  that output  in 
sectors with constant  marginal  cost is close to indeterminate.  If a shock 
depresses the output of a firm  governed by the constant marginal  cost 
hypothesis, there is no strong force tending to restore output to its 
previous  level. The shock may depress profit,  but the firm  cannot raise 
profit  by adjusting  its price so as to raise its output. However, indeter- 
minacy  does not imply  any particular  time series behavior  for output. A 
firm  could choose to stabilize  its output  and let price absorb  all shocks. 
Or, if it had market  power, it could stabilize  price and let quantity  track 
shifts  in demand.  Both strategies  would  yield the same stream  of profits. 
It is tempting  to jump to the conclusion that price stabilization  is the 
prevailing  mode in industries  with market  power. The industries  shown 
in table 1  to have market  power seem to be ones where  management  sets 
a price and customers choose the quantity. However, the data on the 
time series properties  of output  by industry  do not give strong  support 
to that proposition.  Table 3 shows the standard  deviation  and the serial 
correlation  of the rate  of growth  of output  of the industries  in table 1. 
The standard  deviation  of the rate of change of output  is a summary 
measure  of the variability  of output  in an industry.  Under competition, 
the equilibrium  profit-maximizing  level of output  should  rise along with 
capacity.  This proposition  would  remain  true  even if there  were shifts  in Robert E. Hall  319 
demand, because the competitive industry operates at capacity and 
absorbs demand shifts through price variations. Only shifts in the 
capacity level of output could explain significant  random  variation  in 
output  growth  in the competitive  industry.'8 Table 3 does show a slight 
positive  relation  between  market  power  and  output  instability,  but  plainly 
market  power is not the prime  determinant  of instability.  For example, 
output growth in durables  has a standard  deviation of 8.3 percent as 
against  3.8 percent  in nondurables,  even though  measured  market  power 
is identical  and substantial  in both. Textiles is found  to be a competitive 
industry,  but its standard  deviation  is 7.4 percent. In fact, none of the 
industries  found to be approximately  competitive has smooth output 
growth. But those industries  with the most market  power do tend to 
have the most unstable  output. 
Another  dimension  of the  time  series  behavior  of output  is the duration 
of departures  from equilibrium.  The second column of table 3 shows a 
simple  measure  of persistence,  the serial  correlation  of the rate  of change 
of output. A serial correlation  of zero means that output is a trended 
random  walk. Shocks are infinitely  persistent;  there is no tendency for 
an  increase  in one year  to be followed  by a decrease  in the following  year 
as output returns to its equilibrium  level. Negative serial correlation 
means  that shocks are  temporary.  The recent  literature  on random-walk 
components of macroeconomic variables has called attention to the 
importance  of the serial correlation  of the first difference of output.'9 
For total real GNP, the serial correlation  is roughly  zero. The market 
power-excess capacity hypothesis is consistent with random-walk  be- 
havior  of output but does not mandate  it. Table 3 shows quite clearly 
that  output  is more  like a random  walk in competitive  industries  than  in 
18. If capacity  changes  abruptly  from  year  to year, a competitive  industry  could show 
considerable  fluctuations  in the rate  of growth  of output.  To check this point, I calculated 
the standard  deviation  of the rate of growth  of the output-capital  ratio for each of the 
industries.  In competition,  this ratio would remain  nearly stable over time. In fact, the 
standard  deviations  of the rates  of growth  of output  and  the output-capital  ratio  are  almost 
the same in each industry.  Irregular  capacity  growth  is not the explanation  of irregular 
output  growth. 
19. Charles R.  Nelson and Charles I.  Plosser, "Trends and Random Walks in 
Macroeconomic  Time Series: Some Evidence and Implications,"  Journal  of Monetary 
Economics,  vol. 10 (September  1982),  pp. 139-62; John Y. Campbell  and N. Gregory 
Mankiw,  "Are Output  Fluctuations  Transitory?"  Working  Paper  1916  (National  Bureau 
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those with market  power. All of the industries  found  to have substantial 
market  power have negative  serial  correlations  of output  changes. Only 
one of the competitive  industries  shows a negative serial  correlation.  A 
glance  at the data  for  the industries  with substantial  market  power  shows 
why the serial correlation  is negative. Each recession brings a large 
reduction in output. In the succeeding year, part, but not all, of that 
decline  is usually  reversed.  These observations  dominate  the calculation 
of the serial  correlation. 
The fundamental  identifying  hypothesis  of this line of research  holds 
that productivity  fluctuations  are not a driving force in the business 
cycle. This hypothesis enables me to interpret  the empirical  findings  of 
the paper as revealing that market power is  extensive.  Under the 
alternative  hypothesis-that  productivity  shifts are the driving  force of 
macroeconomic  fluctuations-the results have just the opposite inter- 
pretation. To the extent that it is hypothesized that productivity is 
procyclical, there is less room for market  power to explain the same 
facts. At the polar  extreme, if all observed  productivity  fluctuations  are 
taken  to be exogenous  driving  forces, then  there  is an  implicit  assumption 
of pure  competition. 
The third column of table 3 presents a rough test of the hypothesis 
that  productivity  shifts are not a driving  force in aggregate  fluctuations, 
based  on the following  logic: suppose  the hypothesis  is wrong.  The  origin 
of what we observe as the cycle is basically  durables  and construction. 
The cycle must be driven by productivity  shifts in those industries. In 
years when productivity  is low and the economy is in recession, labor 
should  move out of those industries  and  into  unrelated  industries.  Output 
in those industries  should  rise as a result. The competitive  real  business 
cycle model seems to require  that at least some industries should be 
countercyclical. Column 3 shows that essentially every industry is 
procylical. The only industry  with a meaningfully  negative correlation 
with the cyclical industries  is farming. 
The only way to save the real business cycle view is to appeal to a 
systematic tendency for productivity  shifts to occur simultaneously  in 
the same direction  in most sectors. The data are inconsistent with the 
notion that the cycle has its origin in productivity  shifts in the most 
cyclical  industries  and  that  other  sectors merely  respond  to those shifts. 
The negative correlation  for farming  has another  implication,  unfa- 
vorable  to the real  business  cycle view as well:  the one common  influence Robert E. Hall  321 
on productivity  on which we can all agree is the weather. Probably  the 
bulk  of the fluctuations  in real  output  in farming  are  the result  of changes 
in the weather. Hence, farming  serves as a proxy for the influence  of 
weather  on all industries.  But the negative cyclical correlation  of farm 
output  casts doubt  on the one reasonable  influence  that  operates  across 
all industries. 
Conclusions 
The findings of this paper support a view about the operation of 
product  markets  in  the U. S. economy  that  is consistent  with  the observed 
pattern  of large, persistent  movements in aggregate  real output. How- 
ever, the view is anything  but firmly  established.  In essence, the view is 
that many industries  are in equilibrium  along a flat part of each firm's 
marginal cost  schedule. The rents associated with efficient use  of 
resources, with equilibrium  on a steeper part of marginal  cost, would 
attract  additional  entry. A firm  with constant marginal  cost is virtually 
indifferent  to alternative  levels of output.  When  output  is 10  or  20  percent 
below the profit-maximizing  point,  profit  is only a few tenths  of a percent 
below its maximum,  as a proportion  of sales. 
With  extremely  weak incentives to restore  previous  levels of output, 
it is no mystery  that  industries  and  the entire  economy can  undergo  large 
and persistent fluctuations in output. This insight does not lead to 
accurate  predictions  about  movements  in output  and the corresponding 
movements  in prices. Rather,  it supplies  the answer  to the question  that 
has acutely troubled  disequilibrium  business cycle theorists  for the past 
two decades: how are sluggish  price adjustment  and large output fluc- 
tuations  consistent  with rational  economic behavior? 
All of the conclusions of this paper follow from the fact that total 
factor productivity  is procyclical. The measures of the markup  coeffi- 
cient  are  no more  than  an interpretation  of that  fact. And  the conclusions 
about  excess costs are based entirely  on the interpretation  that  procycl- 
ical productivity  reveals market  power. 
The competing  explanation  for procyclical productivity  appears in 
the active and growing  literature  on real business cycles. According  to 
this view, exogenous productivity  shifts, positively correlated  across 
industries,  are  a prime  moving  force  in  the business  cycle. Consequently, 322  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
productivity  growth  and  output  growth  are positively correlated  in each 
industry.  Real business cycle theorists  tend to assume  competition,  and 
this assumption is  consistent with my results: if  cyclical shifts in 
productivity  are an important  reason for the procyclical behavior of 
productivity,  market  power must  be correspondingly  less important. 
As the evidence now stands,  one has a choice between  these two very 
different  views, both  consistent  with  the principal  evidence. Prior  beliefs 
about  the plausibility  of large  exogenous shocks in productivity  are the 
primary  basis upon which the choice has to be made. My own view is 
that productivity  shocks, in the narrow sense of shifts of production 
functions,  are not an important  source  of aggregate  fluctuations.  Hence, 
I believe that  the observed  procyclical  behavior  of measured  productiv- 
ity is in some considerable  part  the result  of market  power. Moreover,  I 
think that the finding of market power in many industries opens up 
avenues  of explanation  of the vulnerability  of total output  to many  other 
types of shocks, including  shifts  in the terms  of trade,  spontaneous  shifts 
in consumption  and  investment,  and  changes  in government  policy. Comments 
and Discussion 
Olivier Jean Blanchard: This is an exciting paper on a potentially 
important  topic  for  macroeconomics.  Much  of our  attention  in  explaining 
business cycles has focused on the structure  of the labor market,  with 
the structure  of the goods market  usually being given low billing. In 
studies  of wage-price  dynamics,  for example,  most of the emphasis  is on 
wage dynamics;  prices are simply assumed to reflect standard  average 
costs, up to a markup  that is largely  independent  of the level of output. 
But, as was pointed  out by William  Nordhaus  in his survey of empirical 
price equations  in 1972, if such a characterization  of price behavior is 
accurate, it points to imperfect competition in the goods market.1  If 
imperfect  competition  is indeed prevalent, it is clearly something  that 
should be taken into account explicitly: it may help us understand  not 
only pricing  behavior  but  investment  demand,  labor  demand,  and so on. 
Hall's paper is part of a research effort aimed at understanding  the 
implications  of imperfect  competition  for macroeconomics.  The paper 
has two distinct parts, the first aimed at documenting  the existence of 
imperfect competition, the second drawing implications for macro- 
economics. I shall  deal with them  in turn. 
The first  part  of the paper  is based on three  facts. 
The "productivity fact. " In the regression 
(1)  y =  an +  e, 
where y and n denote, respectively, the logarithms  of value added and 
man-hours, and e is  the logarithm of total factor productivity, the 
1. WilliamD.  Nordhaus,  "Recent  Developments  in  Price  Dynamics,"  in  Otto  Eckstein, 
ed., The  Econometrics ofPrice Determination (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 1972),  pp. 16-50. 
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coefficient  a is estimated  to be around  1.0, at both the aggregate  and  the 
sectoral  levels. Hall also shows that  it remains  around  1.0  at the sectoral 
level when aggregate value added is  used as an instrument in the 
regression. 
The "share  fact."  While the share of labor  in value added varies in 
the business cycle, its average  value is equal  to 0.75. 
The "profit  fact." The rate of pure profit,  that is, profit  in excess of 
the normal  return  to capital,  is small. While  Hall looks directly  at profit, 
an alternative  approach  is to compute  average  q ratios, which have the 
advantage  of avoiding  some of the issues associated  with the differences 
between  accounting  and  economic  profits.  Average  q  ratios  rarely  exceed 
1.0 for long periods  of time. 
All three  facts have long been well known. The insight  of the paper  is 
to ask how they can be consistent. Its conclusion is that they are 
consistent only if goods markets are imperfect. Let me play devil's 
advocate and return to an alternative explanation based on perfect 
competition.  Hall mentions  but excludes the alternative  on grounds  of 
implausibility,  but it is worth  examining  further. 
Under  the alternative  I offer,  there  is perfect  competition  and  decreas- 
ing returns to labor in the relevant range. And, contrary to Hall's 
maintained  assumption,  productivity  shocks and GNP fluctuations  are 
correlated. 
In this explanation,  perfect competition  explains the profit  fact, and 
decreasing  returns  explain  the share  fact. The correlation  between GNP 
and  productivity  explains  why the estimate  of the coefficient  in equation 
1, which has a true  value equal  to the labor  share,  is biased  upwards  and 
is equal  to 1. The  bias  comes from  the fact  that  movements  up  the upward 
sloping  marginal  cost curve are associated with shifts to the right  of the 
curve: the estimated  marginal  cost curve is much flatter  than the true 
one. 
Two conditions  are necessary to get such a positive and substantial 
correlation.  The first is that productivity  shocks be correlated  across 
sectors, so that the aggregate  productivity  shock is highly correlated 
with sectoral shocks. The second is that aggregate  productivity  shocks 
and  GNP be correlated. 
I find  rather  convincing  Hall's arguments  that  the correlation  between 
productivity  shocks across sectors is likely to be small. While one can 
think  of innovations,  such as the increased  use of computers,  that  affect Robert E. Hall  325 
productivity  in all sectors, they appear  to account  for a small  proportion 
of productivity innovations. But Hall could have supplemented  his 
arguments  with  a  formal  test. Given  that  the  assumption  that  productivity 
shocks are  uncorrelated  across sectors  is not used directly  in estimation, 
it is an assumption  that can be tested under  the maintained  assumption 
that  aggregate  productivity  shocks are  uncorrelated  with  GNP. The way 
to test it is to compute  the set of correlations  of the estimated  productivity 
shocks obtained  by Instrumental  Variables  (IV) estimation  across sec- 
tors. A table giving  these correlations  would be of interest;  I would not 
be surprised  to see positive  correlations  of estimated  productivity  shocks 
across most sectors. If this were the case, it would certainly  weaken 
Hall's argument. 
I find less convincing Hall's arguments  that aggregate  productivity 
shocks and GNP are likely to be uncorrelated.  One does not need to be 
a believer  in real  business cycles to expect a positive correlation.  In the 
most old-fashioned  Keynesian  model  with  fixed  nominal  wages, positive 
productivity  shocks will decrease nominal  prices at any level of output, 
increase  real  money, and  increase  demand  and  output.  It is also plausible 
that, even if the relation is not causal, investment and productivity 
shocks are correlated. If they are, aggregate  demand  will move with 
productivity  shocks. This suggests  the use of truly  exogenous aggregate 
demand  variables  instead of GNP in equation 1. While the search for 
such instruments  has proved elusive, Hall has in the past argued  that 
defense spending  was such an instrument;  it could  be used here as well.2 
To get a feel for how large  the correlation  between GNP and  produc- 
tivity shocks must be in order to reconcile the productivity  and share 
facts-that  is, to imply a bias of about  0.25 in the estimated  coefficient 
when equation 1 is estimated  by the IV method of Hall-consider  the 
following  example. Assume that productivity  shocks are perfectly cor- 
related  across sectors, that each sector has a production  function  given 
by equation  1, with  y and  n in rates  of change, and  that  e, the innovation 
in productivity  growth,  is white noise. Assume that  movements  in GNP 
growth  are given by 
(2)  y =  v +  be, 
2. See Robert  Hall, "The  Role of Consumption  in Economic  Fluctuations,"  in  Robert 
J. Gordon,  ed.,  The American  Business  Cycle:  Continuity and Change  (University  of 
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where v are white noise movements in GNP growth  uncorrelated  with 
the productivity shock e, and b measures the effect of e on y. The 
variables  v and e have variances  respectively equal to ar' and g2e. The 
bias in the estimated  coefficient  ai, obtained  by using y as an instrument 
in equation  1 is a function  of b and  x, the ratio  of the variance  of v to the 
variance  of  e.  Then  ai,  =  a(l  +  b2x)I[l  +  (b2  -  b)x].  A  value 
of ai, =  1.0 while a  =  0.75 is consistent,  for example,  with x  =  1.0 and 
b = 0.26, thus a relatively small value of b. If the productivity  shocks 
are not perfectly correlated  across sectors, the value of b required  to 
explain a bias of 0.25 increases but, as long as the correlation  between 
productivity  shocks is high, the values of b required  to explain  the bias 
are not implausibly  high. 
To summarize,  there  are  good  grounds  to doubt  that  Hall's  assumption 
of no correlation  between productivity  shocks and GNP fluctuations  is 
correct.  Small  deviations  from  this  assumption  may  explain  a substantial 
part of the discrepancy  between the share of labor and the estimated 
coefficient  in equation 1. Because the perfect competition  explanation 
is a plausible  way of reconciling  the  three  facts, Hall's  paper  will  probably 
not change  many  minds. 
On the other  hand,  because in my own view imperfect  competition  is 
an important  characteristic  of the economy, I like Hall's explanation.  It 
rejects  perfect  competition  and  points to monopolistic  competition  with 
fixed costs and  constant  returns  to labor  in the relevant  range. 
Constant returns to labor explain the productivity  fact. Imperfect 
competition implies that price exceeds  marginal  cost,  which under 
constant  returns  is equal  to the wage. Under constant  returns,  the labor 
share is proportional  to the product  wage and thus less than 1.0: that 
explains the share fact. Finally, free entry explains the profit  fact by 
implying that profits must be dissipated, either by large fixed costs 
compared  with the market  or by overaccumulation  of capital or other 
quasi-fixed  factors. 
One way of assessing the plausibility  of the results is to look at the 
cross-section implications. I have computed, for manufacturing,  the 
rank  correlation  between the index of market  power derived in Hall's 
table 1  and  the four-firm  concentration  ratio,  taken  from  Rotemberg  and 
Saloner.3  It is approximately  equal  to zero. Whether  this is bad  news for 
3. Julio J. Rotemberg  and Garth  Saloner, "A Supergame-Theoretic  Model of Price 
Wars  During  Booms," American  Economic  Review,  vol. 76 (June  1986),  pp. 390-407. Robert E. Hall  327 
Hall or bad news for the concentration  ratio can be assessed only on a 
case-by-case basis, and I know far too little about individual  sectors to 
do so. 
The second part  of Hall's paper,  which assesses the macroeconomic 
implications  of imperfect competition, is less convincing. In it, Hall 
chooses to emphasize the implications  of imperfect  competition  when 
marginal  cost is flat. But there is nothing  in the analysis  of the first  part 
that implies that marginal  cost is flat. Indeed, one of the advantages  of 
the method used to estimate market  power in the first part is that it is 
robust, for example, to the presence of adjustment  costs; put another 
way, it gives no information  as to the size of these adjustment  costs and 
thus to the slope of the short-run  marginal  cost curve. 
Does the logic of imperfect  competition  imply  that  marginal  costs are 
flatter  than  they  are  under  perfect  competition  at normal  levels of output? 
The answer is at best maybe. What is true is that excess profits from 
market  power  must, in the long run,  be dissipated  to prevent  entry.  They 
can be dissipated  through  excess capacity, as Hall argues. If that is the 
case, then, other things equal, marginal  cost may indeed be relatively 
flat. But that is one of many ways to reduce profits:  they can also be 
dissipated  by introducing  new products  until  fixed  costs associated  with 
producing  each product  absorb excess profit. In that case, firms need 
not have excess capacity, and  marginal  cost may be very steep. 
What  do we know about  the slope of the marginal  cost curve?  Unless 
we believe that there is a large bias in the estimated coefficient, a, in 
equation 1, we know that there are approximately  constant returns  to 
labor;  the textbook  rationale  for  why marginal  cost is increasing  in output 
is thus ruled  out. But we have other  facts that strongly  point to upward 
sloping  marginal  cost. As pointed  out by Mark  Bils, firms  use overtime, 
which is costly.4 If there were other and cheaper ways of increasing 
production,  they would presumably  use them; that suggests that there 
are adjustment  costs in adjusting  the labor force, that the short-run 
marginal  cost curve is steep. Evidence on labor demand  suggests slow 
adjustment  of labor  demand  to target,  pointing  again  to adjustment  costs. 
Evidence  on inventory  behavior,  while  being  inconsistent  with  the simple 
production-smoothing  model, also suggests costs of adjustment  in pro- 
duction. Taken as a whole, the evidence leads me to conclude that 
4. Mark  Bils, "The  Cyclical  Behavior  of Marginal  Cost  and  Price"  (Ph.D.  dissertation, 
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marginal  cost is not flat. Thus, the challenge  remains  one of explaining 
why prices do not respond  to changes  in marginal  cost. 
Even if imperfect  competition  does not deliver a flat marginal  cost 
curve and thus a straightforward  explanation  of why firms have little 
incentive to change prices and can easily accommodate  variations  in 
demand,  all is not lost. 
First, under  imperfect  competition,  there are other explanations  for 
why prices will not necessarily  move with marginal  costs. Among  them 
are variable demand elasticities, customer attachment, and bilateral 
relationships.  While I do not yet find any of them fully convincing, I 
remain  hopeful. Also, because price decisions are taken  by firms  rather 
than  by an  auctioneer  and  because  the  price  decisions  of one firm  depend, 
both  through  the prices  of its inputs  and  the prices of competing  outputs, 
on the price  decisions of other  firms,  small  lags in adjusting  prices at the 
individual  firm  level can cumulate  into substantial  price inertia at the 
aggregate  level. Thus, imperfect  competition  can explain both a small 
adjustment  of prices to movements  in demand  and  a slow adjustment  of 
prices to changes  in wages, two important  ingredients  of the Keynesian 
model. 
Second, whether or not imperfect competition can explain why 
aggregate  demand  movements  affect output,  it clearly  can explain  many 
of the features of the actual response of the economy to aggregate 
demand  shocks. To take  just two examples,  fixed  costs provide  a simple 
explanation  for  procyclical  movements  in  productivity-if they  are  partly 
in the form of  overhead labor-and  for procyclical movements in 
profitability.  Procyclical movements in profitability  imply in turn that 
the threat  of entry is low or nonexistent  in recessions, and may in turn 
explain why workers and firms  may.not be eager to decrease nominal 
wages and  prices.5 
R. Glenn Hubbard: The merger  of topics and modeling strategies in 
macroeconomics  and industrial  organization,  implicit in economic re- 
search for decades, is-deservedly-receiving  renewed attention. Im- 
perfections in product markets, labor markets, and capital markets 
provide  a foundation  for reconciling  the predictions  of formal  microec- 
5. These  arguments  are  presented  more  formally  in Olivier  Blanchard  and  N. Kiyotaki, 
"Monopolistic  Competition  and  Aggregate  Demand"  (MIT,  September  1986). Robert E. Hall  329 
onomic models with observed movements of  aggregate prices and 
quantities  of interest  to macroeconomists  and  policymakers.  Examples 
of this new line of research  include  models of contracting  and staggered 
price  setting,  "menu  costs" and  sticky  prices, and  imperfect  competition 
and  equilibrium  output  and  employment  levels. Hall's paper  breaks  new 
ground in this area, linking cyclical movements in productivity-a 
phenomenon long studied in empirical macroeconomics-to  market 
power  and  discussing  implications  for output  movements  over the cycle. 
There is much to recommend  this paper. It is both bold and simple, 
centered  on three  basic  ideas. First,  price  substantially  exceeds marginal 
cost in most U.S. industries-a manifestation  of product  market  power. 
Second, market  power coexists with low average  profit  rates, a relation- 
ship  that  Hall attributes  to substantial  excess capacity  in industries  with 
a high markup  of price over cost. Third, U.S. industries  face roughly 
constant  marginal  costs, and  thus  have only a weak  incentive  to maintain 
output  at capacity or to restore full employment  following a decline in 
aggregate  demand;  this last finding  does not appear  to depend  much on 
there  being substantial  market  power. Hall's work is careful  and direct; 
the key assumptions  are highlighted  and  defended. 
Refocusing  attention  on the Solow residual  as conveying  information 
about the relationship  between price and marginal  cost is very useful.' 
My principal  comments  have to do with interpretations  of the spread- 
both quantitatively,  as a reasonable  definition  of margins,  and in terms 
of representing  substantial  product  market  power. Hall's basic message 
about  the importance  of market  structure  considerations  for macroeco- 
nomics is an important  one, however, and I want to present some 
supplementary  empirical evidence using more disaggregated  data in 
support  of some of his conclusions. 
1. Micha  Gisser also finds, but does not emphasize,  a positive relationship  between 
the growth  rate  of output  and  the Solow residual  in a Cobb-Douglas  production  function. 
He also finds  that increases  in concentration  in originally  unconcentrated  industries  are 
associated  with  larger  measures  of total  factor  productivity,  arguing  that  a small  group  of 
efficient  firms  increases  the productivity  of an industry  and  concentrates  it. Micha  Gisser, 
"Price  Leadership  and Dynamic  Aspects of Oligopoly  in U.S. Manufacturing,"  Journal 
of Political  Economy,  vol. 92 (December  1984),  pp. 1035-48. 
Hall  is quite  right  to point  out that  labor  hoarding  is consistent  with  his argument.  With 
labor  hoarding  in a recession, the marginal  cost of labor  is small, so that large spreads 
between  price  and  marginal  cost are  associated  with  positive  Solow  residuals,  even though 
the markup  of price  over average  variable  cost may be small.  Assuming  that  the markup 
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One of the goals of the paper  is to reconcile high  price-cost markups 
with the observation  that most industries  do not appear  to have supra- 
competitive average profit rates. With a high "marketing  profit," as 
measured  by Hall, a loss in "production  profit"  is required  to match  the 
roughly  zero average  profit  in the data. One issue here is ascertaining 
the markup  relevant  for market  power-market  structure  considerations. 
Hall's definition  of marginal  cost does not include  the cost of materials, 
which have a more significant  share  in the value of output  than  labor  in 
many  industries.  Including  materials  costs in the expression  for marginal 
cost, x, (assuming  that industries are input price-takers  and that the 
materials-output  ratio  is constant)  implies  that 
AN  M 
X =  W 
AQ-OQ  + PM  Q, 
where PM and M  denote the price and quantity of materials used, 
respectively. 
The point is more than definitional.  The concept of marginal  cost 
captured  in the standard  Lerner-index  measure  relates to output  and is 
logically  inclusive  of materials,  whose use is presumably  almost  entirely 
marginal  in most industries. For a given industry, a firm's price-cost 
margin  can be expressed as 
P -  MC  si (I  +  Xi) 
P  I 
where si is the ith firm's market share, Xi  is its conjectural  variation 
(the ith firm's  guess about  the output  response of all other  firms),  and q 
is the industry demand elasticity. Some reference points of interest 
include  the monopoly  outcome, PCM  =  l/X, and  the Cournot  outcome, 
PCM  =  Si/Q. 
Hall makes use of industry  data;  we can derive industry  expressions 
by aggregating  across firms. If MC is assumed to equal AVC for each 
firm,  then 
P-A  VC Es_  (1 + xi) 
P 
where AVC is the industry  weighted average variable  cost. Again, we 
can consider  the monopoly  outcome, Robert E. Hall  331 
P-AVC  1 
and  the Cournot-Nash  outcome, 
P -  AVC  Es2  H 
P 
where  H is the Herfindahl  index of concentration. 
It is difficult  to consider issues of relative markups  at the two-digit 
level of aggregation,  which obscures substantial  variations  in markups 
within  a two-digit  grouping.  In a study of SIC four-digit  manufacturing 
industries  with Ian Domowitz and Bruce Petersen, I found that price- 
cost margins  as defined  above were much  closer to the Cournot  predic- 
tions than to the monopoly predictions  (given reasonable  assumptions 
about Herfindahl  indexes and demand  elasticities).2  Price-cost  margins 
never approximate  those predicted by collusion even in very highly 
concentrated  industries. 
Table 1  presents  some summary  information  about  industry  markups 
under  alternative  definitions.  Calculations  are  based  on a panel  data  base 
of 312  four-digit  manufacturing  industries  from  the Census of Manufac- 
tures  from 1958  to 1981  constructed  by Domowitz,  Petersen,  and  myself. 
Tabulations  are  averages  over that  period.  To preserve  complementarity 
with Hall's results, I report  calculations  at the two-digit  level of aggre- 
gation. The first two columns of results report  the labor and materials 
shares  in the value of output;  there  is considerable  variation  in the data, 
but in all cases materials  shares are large relative to labor shares. The 
next two columns contrast Hall's estimates of the ratio of price to 
marginal  cost with direct  calculations  from the data  including  materials 
in marginal  cost. The fifth column reports estimates of the price-cost 
ratio  (again  including  materials)  using Hall's modeling  approach.  Com- 
paring  the rankings  in the third and fourth columns points up some 
differences.  For example, while industry  28 (chemicals  and allied  prod- 
ucts) has a high price-cost ratio in either case, the same does not hold 
for paper,  primary  metals, and transportation  equipment,  whose price- 
2. lan  Domowitz,  R. Glenn  Hubbard,  and  Bruce  C. Petersen,  "Oligopoly  Supergames: 
Some Empirical  Evidence on Prices and Margins,"  Journal of Industrial  Economics 
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cost margins  are less than that for all industries  on-average.  I have no 
information  on the regulated  nonmanufacturing  industries  comprising 
the remainder  of Hall's industries  with "substantial  market  power.  " 
One  contribution  of Hall's suggested  approach  is that  it can  be applied 
to consider  influences  of measures  of market  power  on industry  markups. 
Table 1.  Price-Cost Markups under Alternative Definitions, 1958-81 
Standard 
industrial  Labor  Materials 
classifi-  share in  share in  Hall's  Alternative Estimated 
cation  output  output  price-cost price-cost  price-cost 
code  Industry  (percent)a  (percent)a  ratio  ratioa  ratiob 
20  Food and kindred  products  5.7  46.6  3.09  1.31  1.44 
21  Tobacco  products  8.6  56.6  1.28  1.48  1.72 
22  Textile mill products  16.9  58.2  1.05  1.25  1.35 
23  Apparel  18.3  51.0  1.30  1.28  1.48 
24  Lumber  and wood products  17.4  58.2  1.00  1.26  1.39 
25  Furniture  and fixtures  16.3  41.1  1.38  1.34  1.41 
26  Paper  and allied  products  16.5  52.2  2.68  1.33  1.48 
27  Printing  and publishing  20.7  31.4  1.61  1.52  1.96 
28  Chemicals  and allied  products  10.0  45.5  3.39  1.60  1.59 
29  Petroleum  and coal products  6.9  67.1  n.a.  1.28  1.37 
30  Rubber  and miscellaneous 
plastic  products  20.6  46.2  1.41  1.36  1.56 
31  Leather  and leather  products  19.7  51.9  1.59  1.27  1.39 
*32  Stone,  clay, and  glass  products  20.1  38.8  1.81  1.44  1.76 
33  Primary  metals  15.3  59.6  2.06  1.25  1.36 
34  Fabricated  metals  17.0  45.1  1.39  1.35  1.55 
35  Machinery,  except electrical  17.0  40.1  1.39  1.37  1.51 
36  Electric  machinery,  electronic 
equipment  15.4  42.7  1.43  1.44  1.61 
37  Transportation  equipment  17.5  54.4  2.07  1.24  1.35 
38  Instruments  and related 
products  17.1  35.7  1.29  1.54  1.87 
39  Miscellaneous  manufacturing 
industries  17.8  46.4  1.52  1.38  1.57 
Sources:  Author's  calculations  based  on a panel  data  base of 312 four-digit  manufacturing  industries.  Results  are 
averages  over the period 1958-81.  Results  are averages  over that period  at the two-digit  level of aggregation.  The 
data base is discussed  in Ian Domowitz,  R. Glenn Hubbard,  and Bruce C. Petersen, "Business Cycles and the 
Relationship  between  Concentration  and Price-Cost  Margins,"  Rand  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 17 (Spring  1986), 
pp. 1-17. 
n.a. Not available. 
a. The Census price-cost margin  (PCM)  is used as the basis for the calculation.  Most studies in industrial 
organization  construct  the price-cost  margin  only with respect  to the value of sales. The value of sales may differ 
considerably  from  the value  of output  because  of inventory  changes.  The PCM  here is calculated  as: 
Value of sales  +  A Inventories  -  Payroll  -  Cost of materials 
* 
CM  - 
Value of sales  +  A Inventories 
which  is identical  to (Value added  -  Payroll)l(Value  added  +  Cost of materials),  given  the Census's  definition of 
value added. 
b. Output,  not value added,  is the quantity  unit. Four-digit  data  were pooled  in each two-digit  category.  Results 
are based on the standard  fixed-effects  within-group  estimator.  See Ian Domowitz,  R. Glenn  Hubbard,  and Bruce 
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Returning  to the four-digit  manufacturing  data  described  before, we can 
consider,  for  example,  effects of industry  concentration  and  unionization 
on Hall's margins.  Table 2 reports revised estimates of the price-cost 
markup,  again relative to labor and materials  costs, for "high" and 
"low" levels of industry  concentration,  as measured  by the four-firm 
concentration  ratio, and  of unionization,  as measured  by the fraction  of 
the work force covered by union bargaining  agreements.  Markups  are 
higher  in concentrated  industries,  but  the effect is not large.3  Differences 
by high  and  low levels of unionization  reveal  that  unions  depress  margins, 
a result consistent with previous studies by Richard  Freeman,  Michael 
Salinger,  and Domowitz, Petersen, and myself.4  These results are only 
illustrative,  but they suggest that Hall's methodology  could be applied 
to a range  of structural  models of the influence  of product-  and labor- 
market  characteristics  on industry  margins  and the cyclical behavior  of 
industry  prices and  costs. 
Table 2.  Industry Concentration, Unionization, and Price-Cost Markups, 1958-81a 
Industry  Level of 
concentrationb  unionizationc  All 
industries  High  Low  High  Low 
Estimated  margin  0.352  0.369  0.343  0.279  0.371 
(0.004)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.004) 
Implied markup ratio  1.54  1.58  1.52  1.39  1.59 
Source: Author's  calculations. 
a. Estimates are based on  four-digit  Census manufacturing  data. Data covering 288 industries  (excluding 
"miscellaneous"  and "not elsewhere  classified"  industries)  were used. Fixed-effects  estimates  are reported  above. 
The equation  estimated  is 
Aqit -  aLALit -  aMAMit =  pAqi, 
where 3 is the estimated  margin.  13  is estimated  for all industries,  for high  and low levels of industry  concentration, 
and for unionization.  An instrumental-variables  procedure  is used, with current  and lagged  values of real GNP 
growth  as instruments.  See Domowitz,  Hubbard,  and  Petersen,  "Market  Structure." 
b. "High" refers to industries  in which the average  four-firm  concentration  ratio is greater  than 0.50; other 
industries  are classified  as having  "low" measures  of concentration. 
c.  "High" refers to rates of unionization  greater  than the average  for all industries;  "low" refers to rates of 
unionization  less than  the average  for all industries.  Union  data  were taken  from  Richard  B. Freeman  and  James  L. 
Medoff,  "New Estimates  of Private  Sector  Unionism  in the United  States,"  Industrial  and Labor  Relations  Review, 
vol. 32 (January  1979),  pp. 143-74. 
3. This  result  is not particularly  sensitive  to the chosen point  of division. 
4. Richard  B. Freeman,  "Unionism,  Price-Cost  Margins,  and  the Return  to Capital," 
Working  Paper 1164  (National  Bureau  of Economic Research, July 1983);  Michael  A. 
Salinger,  "Tobin's  q, Unionization,  and the Concentration-Profits  Relationship,"  Rand 
Journal  ofEconomics,  vol. 15  (Spring  1984),  pp. 159-70;  IanDomowitz,  R.  Glenn  Hubbard, 
and Bruce C. Petersen, "The Intertemporal  Stability of the Concentration-Margins 
Relationship,"  Journal  of Industrial  Economics,  vol. 35 (September  1986),  pp. 13-34. 334  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
Such findings  also point up the possibility that the assumption  of a 
constant  markup  of price  over cost may  be inaccurate.  For example,  the 
markup  might  vary over the business cycle, which could explain  in part 
Hall's results, or in response to changes  in import  competition.5 
Finally, a crude way of examining  Hall's assumption  that aggregate 
productivity  shocks are not responsible  for the observed pattern  in the 
Solow residual  would  be to consider  data  before and  after  the oil shocks 
of the 1970s. Though not reported  here, if one estimates Hall's basic 
model (again using panel data on four-digit  manufacturing  industries) 
over the 1958-73 and 1974-81 periods, Hall's results still hold for the 
1958-73  period.  Indeed, the estimated  markup  ratio  is larger. 
As noted, a particularly  interesting  feature of Hall's paper is the 
proposed reconciliation  of high price-cost markups  and low average 
profit  rates. Hall's assertion  of Chamberlinian  competition  may well be 
true for industries engaged in the production  of "consumer goods," 
where  product  differentiation  is important.  One can imagine  that  adver- 
tising  and  investment  in building  "brand  loyalty" are  the important  fixed 
costs. What  then about  the bulk of manufacturing  industries  engaged  in 
the production  of homogeneous "producer  goods"? Hall argues that 
excess capacity  is an important  feature  of the industries  studied  and  that 
"production profits" are negative. The situation is consistent with 
equilibrium  in an  industry  because  firms  must  operate  at (large)  minimum 
efficient  scales. 
My reservation  about the "excess capacity" argument  is that mini- 
mum  efficient  scales in manufacturing  are typically  quite small, so that 
it is difficult  to imagine  an industry  equilibrium  with substantial  excess 
capacity for this reason alone.6  Moreover, engineering  and economic 
studies have largely concluded that long-run  cost curves at the plant 
level are much less steep at suboptimal  plant scales than suggested  by 
5. In fact, Census  price-cost  margins  are procyclical  in concentrated  industries,  and 
spreads  of price-cost  margins  across concentration  levels narrowed  dramatically  in the 
1970s.  See Ian  Domowitz,  R. Glenn  Hubbard,  and  Bruce  C. Petersen,  "Business  Cycles 
and the Relationship  between Concentration  and Price-Cost  Margins,"  Rand  Journal  of 
Economics,  vol. 17  (Spring  1986),  pp. 1-17. 
6.  F. M. Schererandothers,  TheEconomicsofMulti-Plant  Operation:AnInternational 
Comparisons  Study (Harvard University  Press,  1975). See also Joe S. Bain, Barriers to 
New Competition  (Harvard  University  Press, 1956);  and the review in F. M. Scherer, 
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Rand McNally,  1970). Robert E. Hall  335 
many textbook diagrams.7  For example, F.  M. Scherer and others 
calculate the percentage increase in unit costs in the long run as a 
consequence of operating  at only one-third  of the size of the minimum 
efficient  scale, and  find  them  generally  to be not very significant.8 
Outside  of manufacturing,  in such industries  as trucking,  it would be 
difficult  to imagine  high minimum  efficient  scales. For regulated  indus- 
tries in general, the phenomenon  of "excess capital" traceable  to the 
Averch-Johnson  effect is well known. 
A more promising  extension would be to consider the possibility of 
"excess labor" (the labor hoarding  described  by Hall), based on, say, 
specific  human  capital  considerations  in manufacturing  industries  or on 
"excess employment"  in regulated  industries.  If labor  were perceived 
incorrectly as being entirely variable cost,  then measured average 
variable  cost would exceed marginal  cost, reconciling  the issues raised 
by Hall and  explaining  the finding  I mentioned  previously  of procyclical 
Census price-cost margins,  which are defined with respect to average 
variable  cost. 
The paper concludes with three "lessons for macroeconomics," 
addressing  issues of cyclical productivity,  capacity constraints  and the 
shape  of the aggregate  supply  schedule, and  incentives to expand  to full 
employment.  With  respect  to the first  point, I agree  wholeheartedly  that 
more research  by macroeconomists  on links between market  structure 
and cyclical fluctuations  is needed. While  agreeing  with the finding  that 
price exceeds marginal  cost, I would only caution  that  this spread  need 
not be indicative  of substantial  realized  product  market  power. I am  less 
sanguine  about  the policy implications  coming  from  the second point; I 
am not persuaded  by the claim that "numerous  firms inhabit market 
niches  with surplus  capacity  because the constraint  of minimum  scale is 
binding." The third lesson is perhaps most interesting in suggesting 
promising  directions  for future  research. 
Hall's calculations  of the relatively small impact  of sales reductions 
on  profits  are  very  interesting.  With  constant  marginal  cost and  a constant 
price  elasticity  of demand,  there seems to be little sensitivity  of profit  to 
7.  See Scherer and others,  The Economics  of Multi-Plant Operation; and Leonard W. 
Weiss, "Optimal  Plant  Size and  the Extent  of Suboptimal  Capacity,"  in Robert  I. Masson 
and P. David Qualls,  eds.,  Essays  on Industrial Organization  in Honor  of Joe  S. Bain 
(Ballinger  Press, 1975),  pp. 123-42. 
8.  Scherer and others,  The Economics  of Multi-Plant Operation. 336  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1986 
output movements. The finding is  not particularly  sensitive to the 
existence of large markups;  for elasticities near unity and for large 
elasticities,  Hall's  calculated  reduction  in  profits  accompanying  a decline 
in output is small,  relative to sales. I have two reservations  about the 
interpretation  of this finding.  First, I am not convinced that the case of 
increasing  price elasticity with increases in output  is any more obvious 
than one of decreasing price elasticities as output increases. Losses 
would  be substantially  larger  under  a linear  demand  curve, for example. 
Second, despite Hall's reservations,  some measure  of the level of initial 
profit  rather  than sales would seem to be a better indicator  of "large" 
and "small" effects. The reductions are much larger  as a fraction of 
initial  profit  (quite  large  in the linear  demand  case), a fact presumably  of 
concern  to management.  The "near-indeterminacy"  finding  is nonethe- 
less  important and suggestive.9 Industry-level estimates of demand 
elasticities and marginal  cost schedules are needed to sort these issues 
out. 
These reservations  notwithstanding,  Hall's paper  provides  an impor- 
tant step in linking  methodologies  and agendas  in macroeconomics  and 
industrial  economics. 
General  Discussion 
Christopher  Sims applauded  Hall's focus on the macroeconomics  of 
imperfectly  competitive  markets  but  noted  that  his quantitative  measures 
of market power are highly unreliable. Although Hall considers but 
dismisses potential sources of bias by arguing  that none is likely to be 
large, Sims stressed that even small biases may add up to significant 
estimation  problems.  Sims  also cautioned  that  period-by-period  changes 
in the wage bill may understate  the true marginal  costs of production. 
For  example,  if a firm  expands  output  but  postpones  needed  maintenance 
in doing so, the true marginal  cost of output  exceeds the current  period 
9.  Long-term  contracts can also explain price rigidity  of the sort noted in Hall's 
International  Nickel example,  with associated  implications  for "output  indeterminacy." 
Robert  Weiner  and I have considered  the role of constant marginal  cost in reconciling 
contracting-based  price-rigidity  outcomes  under  competition  and  monopoly.  No unambig- 
uous outcome can be delineated, but, in general, results depend on the slopes of the 
demand  and  marginal  cost curves.  Price  stickiness  will  be  relatively  greaterundermonopoly 
the flatter  is the marginal  cost curve or the steeper is the demand  curve. See R. Glenn 
Hubbard  and Robert  J. Weiner, "Nominal  Contracting  and Price Flexibility  in Product 
Markets,"  Working  Paper  1738  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  October  1985). Robert E. Hall  337 
increase in costs  because the true cost  also includes the deferred 
maintenance expenses.  Relatedly, Robert Gordon commented that 
Hall's estimates  are likely to be quite sensitive to the time period over 
which  changes  in output  and  labor  input  are computed.  While  labor  may 
not be fully adjusted  in response  to changes  in output  over a single  year, 
it is likely  to be adjusted  over two to three  years. Taking  Hall's measures 
literally,  Gordon  continued,  one would conclude that  the market  power 
of individual  Japanese  firms, which do not vary employment  much in 
response  to short-run  output  fluctuations,  was greater  by a factor  of two 
to three than the market  power of individual  U.S. firms.  Gordon  found 
such a conclusion  implausible. 
Gregory  Mankiw  noted  that  Hall's  intuitively  appealing  argument  that 
true productivity shocks could not be  so closely correlated across 
industries  as to account for observed fluctuations  in aggregate  output 
should apply equally well to long-term  productivity  growth. Yet there 
has  been an  aggregate  productivity  slowdown  since  the mid-  1970s,  which 
suggests that productivity developments may be  correlated across 
industries. There could, therefore, be something to the notion that 
productivity  shocks are a source  of business  cycles; if so, it would mean 
Hall's marginal  cost estimates are wrong. William  Nordhaus  suggested 
that, in attempting  to estimate the response of output and labor to 
demand  changes, it would be better to use variables, such as defense 
spending, that are unambiguously  demand shifts, rather than GNP. 
Major  macroeconomic  shocks, such as OPEC  price  changes, apparently 
affected  productivity  trends  across many  industries  during  the 1970s  and 
early 1980s.  If so, the GNP variable  is, at least in part,  capturing  supply 
rather  than  demand  shocks. 
Lawrence  Summers  found  it easy to believe that  most firms  would  be 
delighted to sell more output at current prices, implying that most 
markets  are  characterized  by monopolistic  competition,  as Hall  suggests. 
However, Summers  doubted that the excess capacity associated with 
monopolistic  competition  reflects  minimum  efficient  scales of operation. 
Summers's  preferred  explanation  is that physical plants that are large 
enough to meet peak demand are less than fully utilized at nonpeak 
periods. 
Robert  Pindyck  was surprised  at some of the industries  Hall  classifies 
as having substantial  market  power. The Chamberlinian  monopolistic 
competition model, which relies on product differentiation,  does not 
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glass; yet all are categorized  by Hall as industries  in which firms  have 
substantial  market  power.  The  paper  would  be more  convincing,  Pindyck 
continued,  if there  were more  discussion  of the source of market  power 
for the industries  with high  price-cost margins.  Summers  noted that the 
absence of a strong correlation  between Hall's price-cost margin  esti- 
mates and conventional concentration  estimates does not necessarily 
undermine  Hall's estimates. Previous work by Michael Salinger has 
shown that  Tobin's  q and  concentration  have no systematic  relationship 
until  unionism  is taken  into account, revealing  that there  are large  rents 
in concentrated  sectors but that  unions  capture  them. 
Kenneth  Judd  cautioned  against  jumping  too quickly  from  positive to 
normative  conclusions. The recent theoretical  research cited by Hall 
has indeed  shown  that  Chamberlin's  imperfect  competition  theory  could 
be modeled  formally,  but  it has also shown  that  what  Chamberlin  labeled 
excess capacity  was in fact not inconsistent  with efficiency. 